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The growing ubiquity of computer~ and their associated networks is propelling the 
world into the information age. Computers may revolutionize terrorism in the same manner 
that they have revolutionized everyday life 
Terrorism in the information age will consist of conventional terrorism, in which classic 
weapons (explosives, guns, etc,) will be used to destroy properry and kill victims in the 
physical world, technoterrorism, in which classic weapons will be used to destroy 
infrastructure targets and cause a disruption in cyberspace; and cyberterrorism, where new 
weapons (malicious software, electromagnetic and microwave weapons) will operate to 
destroy data in cyberspace to cause a disruption in the physical world 
The advent of cybenerrorism may force a shift in the definition of terrorism to include 
both disruption and violence in cyberspace in the same manner as physical destruction and 
'violence. Through the use of new technology, terrorist groups may have fewer members, yet 
sti ll have a global reach. The increasing power of computers may lower the threshold of state 
sponsorship to a point where poor states (;an become sponsors and rich states are no longer 
neces~ary for terrorist groups to carry out complex attacks 
This thesis explores the shift toward information warfare across the conflict spectrum 
and its implications for terrorism By examining the similarities and differences with past 
conventional terrorism, polrcymakers will be able to pla(;e information age terrorism into a 
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As the world enters the information age, the military has undenaken extensive study 
of the "Revolution in Milital)' Affairs" and information warfare This thesis examines the 
Implications of information warfare tactics and technique~ for terrorism It explores the 
possibility that oomputers may revolutionize terrorism 
Two concepb are olten embodied in academic definitions ofterrorism: violence and 
tcrror. By adding information warfare teclmiques, the definition of terrorism could be 
expanded to include "cyberviolcnce," the destmction or manipulation of computer 
information The "violence" done to this information, which is becoming increasingly 
imponant for secUlity and economic prosperity, should be considered telTorism. Although 
terrorists might tum from destruction to the creation of mass disruption, the addition of 
information warfare tactics to the terrorist's arsenal does not imply a less destructive future 
Should tenorists choose to target crit ical oomputcr systems they could create destmction and 
disruption simultaneously 
This thesis identifies three catcgories of potential information age terrOlism 
conventional terrorism, technoterrorism, and cyberterrorism. Conventional terrorism destroys 
or threatens a symbolic target of violence in the physical world. Conventional terrorists may 
use information warfare tactics to plan and execute these actions more effectively 
T eclmoterrorism is designed to have an effect in cyberspace using physical mean~. This type 
of terrorism includes bombing infrastmcture targets (power, telecommunications, etc .) to 
create a disruption in cyberspace. Teclmoterrorists do not utilize physical destruction, such 
)(iii 
as bombing a power station, to convey a message, Rather, they rely on the attendant 
cyberspace disruption to gamer publicity for his cause. Cyberterrorism is terrorism that 
operates exclusively in cyberspace. The cybeneITorist could utilize an entirely new class of 
weaponry, possibly including malicious software or electromagnetic pulse generators, to 
manipulate or destroy information in cyberspace. Because cybenerrorists do not operate 
using "conventional" techniques, the lessons learned. from previous counter and anti-terrorism 
efforts might be of limited value 
This thesis reaches several conciusioIlS regarding information age terrorism First, the 
dcfmition of terrorism must change to include cyberviolence and disruption. Second, the 
terrorist threat is likely to become more "demassified," with smaller numhers of individuals 
able to create disruption via virtual worldwide organizations. Third, the pattern of state 
sponsorship is likely to change Volhile old state sponsors will continue to exist, terrorists may 
tum to poorer states or choose to fund themselves via information warfare crime, Founh, 
irtformation warfare techniques may afford terrorists the ability to target their message more 
effectively. Fifth, the nature of ofiense and defense in cyberspace does oot mirror that of 
'oooventionaI" offense and defense in the physical world 
In light of these conclusions, the best method to counter information age terrorism is 
a joint governmentJindustry program of defensive measures that will increase the effort 
required for computer disruption while simultaneously diminishing the potential retU!ns 
offered by this new form of terrorism 
1. L~TRODUCTION 
Tomorrow's terrorist maJi be able to do more damage with a keyboard lhall with a bomhl 
A. BACKGROUND 
A~ the world enter~ the 21st century, the iniormation revolution will continue to 
propel the United States into the "third wave" of development according to Alvin and Heidi 
T oftlerl The shift from an industrial economy and society to one focused on information and 
its transfer will characterize the third wave. As discussed in The Third Wave and their most 
recem work, War and Anti-Wcu, the way a statl;.": wages war is similar to how it makes wealth 
This idea might be applied to terrorism and revolutionary violence 
Le ..... is Gann's Guerrillas in History provides an overview of substate violence across 
hi~tory3 Oc(;asionally. as in the Welsh use orthe longbow, suhstatc groups possess weapons 
superior to those of the state. Substate actors, unless being supplied by another statl;.":, 
normally pos~ess weapons that are inferior to thosl;.": of the target state. They often use 
weapons stolen from, or discarded by, the state. As the teclmology, complexity, and lethality 
j National Research Council, System Security Study Committce, Computers at 
Risk: Safe Computing in the Injormalion Age (Washington D.C.. :'-Iational Academy 
Press, 199 1).7 
2Alvin Tomer, !he Third Wave (New York Willjam Morrow and Co., 1980) 
lLewis G-ann, Guerrd/as in History (Stanford CA Hoover Institution Press, 
1971) 
of weapons systems increased during the twentieth century, these weapons were even more 
tightly comroUed by the state, widening the gap between state and substate "firepower." As 
the world shifts into the infonnation age, this disparity in weapons decreases, with individuals 
and substate groups now able to control information manipulation tools that were once 
restricted to the state 
As the world shifts into the "third ',vave," where infonnation and its control are rapidly 
becoming the most imponant considerations for the advancing societies of the first world, will 
we see a corresponding shift by terrorists and revolutionaries to using "infonnation warfare" 
weapons and techniques to press their case? While terrorists and revolutionaries have "kept 
pace" with the advance of technology, consistently exploiting new and under defended 
targets, (embassies, airplane hijackings, hostage laking, airplane bombing) they have done so 
through evolution, not innovation Bruce Hoffman contends, "What innovation does occur 
is mostly in the methods used to conceal and detonate explosive devices, not in their tactics 
or in their use of non-conventional weapons (ie, chemical, biological, or nuclear)"4 This 
thesis e.'{piores the implications of infonnation age terrorism. There has already been a shift 
toward "information warfare" across other parts of the "conflict spectrum" with these 
teChniques being used by criminals, agents of espionage, revolutionaries, and armies engaged 
in warfare. A corresponding shift in terrorist tactics has yet to occur. While some argue that 
'Bruce Hoffman, Responding to Terrorism Across the TechnolOgical Spectrum 
(Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1994),6 
it is merely a matter of time before we are faced .... 1th a major information warfare attack, 
there are several reasons that terrori~ts may not act ively pursue the~e techniques 
B. PROBLEM STATF.MEN') 
This onset of the information-dependent third wave provides opportunities for 
spectac:.rlar gains, and serious losses for jndividual ~, corporations, and states, It is within this 
world that the cyberterrorist will operate In the same manner that terrorists have exploited 
widely accepted technology such as dynamite and the airplane (for bombing and hijacking), 
they may exploit the tools of the "information age" to bring their case before the citizens of 
the world The United States must prepare itself to counter this threat in an age where the 
old AT&T slogan, "reach out and touch someone" takes on a sinister new meaning. To 
defend against a threat, one must understand its critical elements. Cyberterrorism, like 
"conventional" terrorism, will strive to change the mind of its intended audience, It will be 
perpetrated by people to have an effect on people, However, cyberterrorism may utilize a 
different means to this end. A cyherterrorist will strive, not to disrupt physical reality directly 
(as an exploding bomb would) but rather to disrupt the normal functioning of computers and 
other information systems, This cyberspace disruption would cause a disruption in the 
physical world, The violence that is normally associated with tenorism may shift into 
"cyberspace" where bits and bytes, not people, are attacked, To understand the potential shift 
in terrorism, thi~ thesis splits information age terrorism into three categories conventional 
terTmism, technotenorism, and cyberterrorism Appendix A provides a summary of the 
critical elements of each category 
This thesis will also analyze the costs and benefits of information warfare teclmiques 
for terrorism and the changes that they may force in the definition ofterrorism. Despite the 
inevitable warnings that "the sky is falling," the utility of information warfare attacks may 
actually be lowest in the "terrorist" portion of the conflict continuum. This does not, 
however, obviate the need to address the threaL The infonnation warfare threat is real; it 
mi.ght cause serious damage in the future While it may not fit accepted definitions of 
terrorism, ~eal Pollard correctly states that, 'to ignore computer abuse as a political crime, 
simply for the sake of academic purity, is impractical, dangerous esoteric snobbery,,1 N; we 
will see in this examination of the "brave new world" into which we are headed, there are 
reasons both for and against terrorism shifting toward IW tactics in the third wave 
C. DATA 
\Vhi le the United States has yet to suffer an acknowledged cyberterrorist attack, 
several computer crimes and incidents reveal the power ofinfonnation warfare The trend 
toward infonnation warfare appears uniform across the conflict continuum with the exception 
of terrorism. The cases used in this thesis were selected from unclassified literature They 
were selected for their ability to highlight the potential threat posed by information warfare 
tactics and techniques The ongoing information revolution, coupled with the sensitive nature 
of computer systems for both business and defense, ensure that this is not a comprehensive 
INca! Pollard, "Computer Terrorism and the Information Infrastmcture," in 
{njowurCon'95 Conference Proceedings: Held in Arlington VA 7-.8 September J995, 
(Carlisle PA: National Computer Security Association, 1995) 1-9 
examination of all computer related incidents but it is sufficiently broad to cover thl:': entire 
"low intensity" spectrum of conflict 
Tltis thesis will examine the role of information warfare in espionage and crime using 
cases involving the United States, The role oftdecommunications assets in the Solidarity 
movement in Poland, the Tiananmen Square uprising, and the Zapatista movement in Mexico 
will be highlighted to show the increasing value of information warfare to insurgents and 
rebels and the increasing importance of computer connectivity Exploring the role computers 
and networks have played in terrorist actions since 1970 will identify the trend in tcrrorism 
toward infrastructure warfare, technoterrorism, and cyberterrorism. Finally, the 1988lntemet 
Worm incident camed by Robert Morris will be utilized as an example of both the costs and 
benefits information warfare tactics offer to a terrorist 
D. LIMITA TIO:'IJS 
Information warfare is a concept that emhraces many clements beyond simply 
attacking computers and communications networks, This thesis will, however, focus 
primarily on the portion of information warfare that deals with computers and their associated 
networks and only tangentially cover such topics as psychological operations_ The 
revolutionary changes caused hy computers present the possibility of revolutionary changes 
in the targets and conduct of terrorism 

II. AN [VOL VING CO~CEPT 
A. l~FORl\'lA nON AGE TERRORISM 
Terrorism will change in the 21st century Information warfare, thc current "hot 
topic" for the military, along with Command and Control Warfare «(;2W) are t\.vo concepts 
that some arguc wil l create or accelerate a "Revolution in ~1ilitary Affairs_" The~c ideas also 
suggest the poS5ibility of a "Revolution in Terrorism Affairs_" Information age terrorism may 
take on three distin,,1 forms: conventional terrorism, technoterrorism, and cyberterrorism 
W1lile conventional terrorism will still rely on physical violence, terrorists acquisition of high 
technology information warfare capabilities will allow a shift toward tactics focused on 
disruption rather than destruction. Information age terrorism, while continuing to use 
"conventional" weapons, will also employ weapon~ radically different from those used in 
conventional terrorism This shift toward disruption in cyberspace, through the use of new 
weapons and \.Vilhout the use ofviolencc in the physical world, may force a redefinition of the 
classic conception of terrorism 
lnfomlation Warfare 
The definition ofTnforrnation Warfare has been extensively debated in the open press 
The Department of Defense has a classified definition ofInformation Warfare contained in 
DOD Direcllve TS3600 .1 , but the public debate 011 the suhjeet will be sufficient for the 
purposes of this thesis. Drs JOM Arquilla and David Ronfeldt capture the broad nature of 
emerging information age. The form described as hacker war (warfare against computer 
ncn .... orks) is split into three areas by Libicki . the physical, the syntactic, and the semanticW 
rhe physical attack of computer networks is classified as teclmoterrorism by my typology 
The attack of computer systems at the syntactic level (attack on the flow of dectrons within 
the network) and at the semantic level (attacks on the veracity of a network's information--
fooling the computer into producing an output that is incorrect) are defined as cybenerrorism 
because they exist exclusively in the realm of cyberspace 
There are nvo components ofTnfonnation Warfare. First, your own information must 
be protected and trusted at all levels. During collection, the accuracy of the information 
received must be verified. During processing, information must be defended against theft, 
destruction and modification. Finally, during distribution of information to other elements, 
the means of transfer must be secure to ensure that the infonnation arrives at its destination 
in an unaltered format. The defensive portion of infonnation warfare aims to ensure 
information confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
Second, an effort to disrupt the information gathering, processing, and distribution 
functions of the enemy must be undertaken. The effort to manipulate the information ofthe 
enemy while protecting your own takes place on several levels Infonnation warfare is not 
just about computers sending electrons from point A to point B It is not only the hardware 
and software but the "wetware" (computer slang for a human brain) that is critical to 
'''Libicki, Chapter 7 
]0 
infomlation warfare The fundamental goaJ of warfare is to change the mind aflhe enemy and 
wnvince him to do your will. The goal of information warfare is to accomplish this through 
the manipulation of the entlmy's ability to control information This places jnformation 
wanare in the camp of Sun Tzu :Michacl Handel caplures the essence of infonnation warfare 
by quoting both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu who states, "For 10 win one hundred vi".orics in one 
hundred battles is not the acme of skill To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme 
of skill." This effort to win without fighting runs counter to Clausewitz, who believed that 
combat and bloodshed were an integral part of warfare "Kind-heaned people might of 
course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat and enemy without too much 
bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the an of war. P leasant as it sounds, it 
is a fallacy that must be exposed ,"]l While contradit--tory, both quotes apply to terrorism in 
the information age While perceived as " less bloody," and "not rcally fighting," physical 
destruc tion can play illl important role in inJonnation warfare. One of the tools of infonnation 
warfare is infrastru(.-ture warfare, in which the infrastructure of an enemy is targt--ted with both 
"regular" technology (bombs, missiles, troops on the ground) and "information" technology, 
the attempt to utilize malicious software to disrupt and alter enemy telecommunications 
without physical destruction and 10 induce a psychological state in thc enemy that v.-iH lead 
him to "do your will " 
l'Michaell Handel, Maslers oj War.- Sun TZII, Cla!L~ewiLz and Jumini (London 
r rank Cass and Co" 1992), 7S 
II 
Infonnation warfare is the quest to disrupt, disable, destroy, or modify an adversary 's 
information and information systems while simultaneously protecting your own, While 
ele(;tronic attacks of a network via computer and modem are the "cleanest" means of 
information warfare, physical attacks on the network's infrastn.l(,.'ture are also possible and 
should always be considered as an option open to terrorists. 
Command and Control Warfare (C2n) 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of Policy Number JO 
"Command and Control Warfare," identifies Command and Control Warfare (C2\V) as the 
military component ofinfonnation warfMe, 12 Both tcrrorism and information warfMc cover 
a larger speetrum of (;onflicl than simply command and control, but the fundamentals of both 
are rooted in the ability to affect the thinking of the enemy, As a result , there are several 
useful parallcls between C2W and terrorism in the information age 
L1Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum of Po/icy Number 30 
(Washington D,C , 8 March 1993),3 
12 
Figure I displays how olfensive and defensive C2\V is vie,-ved in the military. lJ 
The "five pillars" of C2W (electronic warfare, physical destruct ion, operations security, 
psychological operations, military deception) are designed to help classify a military 
operation Each of these pillars is also applicable to terrorism. An understanding of C2W is 
useful in examining both the intemal and external workings of terrorist organizations 
'3Wayne 1. Rowe, Information Warfilre : A Primer for Navy Personnel (Ne\.vport 
US Naval War College, 1995), 10 
13 
Properly peJionning in all five areas enhances the abi lity of a terrorist organization to mount 
all offensive against its opponent. If one of the areas is weak, it can be exploited by the 
organization under attack and used to disrupt or destroy a terrorist organi:tation. While the 
defending group targets the weakness of a terrorist group, the terrorist group will target any 
perceived weakness of the defending group, This continual targeting and retargeting of actual 
and perceived weaknesses is the hasis for determining the type of strategy that a defending 
group will usc, If a terrorist organization is seen to have several glaring weaknesses in its C2 
structure, the defending group may find it most effective to pursue an offensive strategy in 
an effon to destroy the terrorists If, however, the terrorists' C2 networks are hard to 
identify, target , and attack, the only option open to the defender is to establish a defensive 
strategy in cyberspace whereby the costs of attack are increased, and the benefits reduced 
New technology has atrected the C2W "balance of power" between tt.:rrorists and authorities 
Counter-terror forces now have the capability to more closely monitor conununications 
channels using increasingly sophisticated computers, Terrorists, however, can abo use 
increasing computer power and publicly available encryption teclmology to secure their 
memlx.:r's conununications. Terrorists, in the past, operated in what J Bowyer Bell described 
as a "dragonworld," where they were forced to live in fear of constant govenunent 
surveillance,] 4 With the rise of secure voice and data conununications (i.c" Pretty Good 
I'J. Bowyer Bell, "Aspects of the Dragonworld: Coven Conununications and the 
Rebel Ecosystem," imernacional Journal oj Inlelligence and Counterintelligence, 3-1 
(Spring 19!19) 15-43 
14 
Privacy (PGP) for E-mail and PGPphone for Internet voice communication encryption), 
terrorists can emerge from the dragonworld. Conventional defensive C2W restrictions no 
longer exist for the information age tl;.':rrorist, \\ho can devote more time to offensive C2W 
and other acts without constantly worrying about secure communication 
Defense in cyberspace bears some resemblance to defense in the physical 
world. The most cffl;.':ctive defeuse is to isolate a computer or network completely from the 
rest of cyberspace, lfthl;.':re is no access into a computer system because it has heen removed 
from all networks, defending it wi!! be easier. The primary concern for such a "stand alone" 
computer is the possibility of an authorized user inserting some fonn of malicious software 
The problems associated with trusted individuals "going over" to the enemy camp have 
existed throughout history and are hardly unique to the information age. The second fonn 
of defense is similar to a point defense with access to a computer system challenged by an 
authentication and identification procedure, In this case, the computer asks for and verifies 
the password provided by the user. While "static" passwords that do not change arc 
vulnerable to attack by random guessing, technology, such as the "smart card," exists to 
provide a constantly changing set of passwords that are nearly impossihle to crack 
Increasing the transmission paths availahle to data is akin to a dl;.':fense in depth, As the data 
paths increase, the ability of an enemy to attack all of them successful ly decreases, When one 
communication path is destroyed or degraded (by accident, natural causes, or malicious 
action), data will instantaneously switch to one of the other available paths with no impact to 
the end user. The use of encryption to cn~urc the confidentiality and integrity of data consists 
15 
of electronically scrambling, and thus armor plating, the data that is to be sent through 
cyherspace Even if the data is intercepted and copied, its contents remain unknov.rn to the 
enemy until they can decrypt it, which may take years 
The ever shifting nature of conventional terrorism causes difficulty for 
defender states who attempt to pursue an offensive strategy against terrorism. The inability 
to targd and attack small terrorist groups, plus the myriad of defensive tcchniques available 
to both state and substatc actors will only increase the problems associated with countering 
conventional terrorists as they exploit the principles ofinfomJation warfare 
2. Infrastructure Warfare: 
Infrastructure Warfare is an attack against the physical components of a state's 
networks, such as powcr and watcr distribution, telcconunurucations networks, rail lines, and 
roads As related to infonnation warfare, infrastructure warfare is detined as a physical attack 
on system components that would subsequently influence the ability to process or transmit 
information. As such, bombing the telephone switching buildings that serve a spccific 
location to isolate it from the rest of the world or destroying the electrical grid that supplies 
power to a targeted system would constitute infrastructure warfare, Terrorists have already 
proven that they are capable of physical destruction via numerous airline, building, and 
infrastmr,,1ure bomhings. Terrorists design these events to "send a message" to the world and 
to terrorize specific target audiences. Terrorist infrastructure warfare may utilize the same 
tools, such as bomhs, with which the terrorist is familiar, but for a different purpose. Instead 
of attempting to "make a statement" by bombing a physicallarget for a physical impact, a 
l6 
tt:rrorist group can bomb infrastructure targets to cause cascading failures (loss of electricity 
leads to loss of computers which leads to loss of communications, etc_) within a targeted 
systt:m These secondary effects of the bombing, which may only destroy equipment Mthout 
causing personnel casualties, are the primary goal of the terrorist in infrastructure warfare 
J. Cyberspace 
Cyberspace is a term coined to capture the essence of "where" computers work 
\Vhile the physical components of computers and their networks are necessary for cyberspace 
to exist, it is more than merely the sum of these parts Willll Schwartau defines cyberspace 
as follows 
Cyberspace is that intangible place between computers where information 
momentarily exists on its route from one end of the global network to the 
other, When lillIe Ashley calls Grandmother, they are speaking in 
Cyberspace, the place between the phones. Cyberspace is the ethereal reality, 
an infinity of electrons speeding down copper or glass fibers at the speed of 
Eght from one point to another. Cyberspace includes the air waves vibrating 
with cellular, microwave and satellite communications_ According to John 
Perry Barlow, cofounder of Electronic Frontier Foundation, Cyberspace is 
where all of our money is, except for the cash in our pocket"" 
The Defense rnfonna\ion Systems Agency, a branch of the Department ofDt.ofense charged 
with conducting defensive infonnation warfare defines cyberspace as 
The electronic environment formed by the aggregate of global computing and 
telecommunications resources. Cyberspace is a virtual Sth dimension 
llWinn Schwartau, Ir!formation Warfare: Chaos on the Electronic Superhiglmmy 
(New York: Thunder's Mou\h Press, 1994),49 
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characterized hy: no geographic, national, or temporal boundaries, no 
ownership, laws, or identity cards, 16 
Cyberspace does not have a physical reality. One cannot physically "enter" cyberspace It 
consists of the "virtual world" through which all electronic transactions take place It is in 
this realm that the cyberterrorist will operate 
4. Cyberterrorism 
The term cyhenerrorism refers to the use of information warfare tactics and 
techniques by terrorist organizations to affect cyberspace, The cybenerrorist will operate 
exclusively within cyberspace and will not physically destroy any ofthe infrastructure that 
supports the existence of cyberspace. While cyberterrorists wish to have an impact on the 
actions of real people in the real world, they operate within the virtual world of cyberspace 
to manipulate these actors. Thus, if cybenerrorists wished to take down a telephone system 
or an electric grid, they would atlack the computers controlling the system and not its 
subsidiary physical components 
Weapons of the (yherrerrori!)t 
The weapons of the cyberterrorist are not designed to kill people or break 
physical objects, Rather, they exist exclusively to destroy or modifY computer data, The 
weapons and the targets are the electrons moving within cyberspace, While it is possible to 
" Robert Ayers (Chief, Information Warfare Division, DISA) presentation. "DISA 
and Information Warfare," to InfoWarCon'95 , 7-8 September 1995, Washington, D.C 
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attack th:s data without any human interfaces. the human is usually the weakest link in a 
compllter system 
Joseph Sean.or ofCLBlR Corporation, a computer crime investigative group, 
recently discussed the "Methods of Opera lions" ofCyberterrorists. His definition~ provide 
a useful starting point to examine how cyberterrorists may attack their largets . The critical 
dement in cyherterrorism, and information warfare in general, is knowledge, While the 
"tools" of the cyberterrorist (computers, modems, phone connect ions) are nearly universally 
avai lable, the knowledge of computer systems and thei r weaknesses (while becoming 
increasingly common) is not as easily obtained. Individuals who have the requisite level of 
knowledge to become cybertcrrorists fall into three main (;atcgories_ The first is a "hacker"' 
defined as a "person that breaks into (;omputers to prove that it can be done. Some arc 
destructive in nature, others are purely joyriders" The second category is the cyberpunk, "a 
harder edgerl computer hacker, one that eIVoys technology and uses that technology to make 
money or a(;t as an anarchist." The third category is the cypherpunk, "a person that is 
interested in the u~e of encryption to protect the privacy and the usc of decryption methods 
to access other prote<.,"!ed files,": ' Paul Strassmann notes that, with the skills resident in these 
groups, several risks to computer systems exist 
Pest Programs 
-Trojan horse attacks- implanting malicious code, sending 
letter bombs 
The Cyber-Terrorisl presenled to InfoWarCon'95 7-8 
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-Logic bombs- setting time or event bombs 
-Malevolent worms- denying access to distributed resources 
-Virus Attacks- attaching code to programs and replicating it 
Bypasses 
-Backdoor attacks- using existing flaws in software for 
exploitation 
-Authorization attacks- password cracking, hacking control 
files 
Active :\.1isuse 
-Creating, modifying, denying service, entering false or 
misleading data 
-Incremental attacks- using salami tactics 
-Denials of service- launching salUration attacks 
Passive Misuse 
-Browsing- reading and copying with apparent authorization 
-Interference, aggregation- exploiting database searches, 
traffic analysis 
-Indirect misuse- preparing for subsequent misuses, off-line 
pre-encryptive matching, factoring numbers to obtain crypto 
keys, autodialer and voice-mail scanning_ll 
To achieve these results, the cybenerrorist cannot use the weapons commonly employed in 
conventional terrorism While a conventional terrorist finds a fenilizer bomb effective in 
blowing up a building or other symbolic target, a technoterrorist will find the same bomb 
useful in destroying a critical node in a network to cause disruption . Cyberterrorists have no 
usc for physical explosives_ Their weapons exist nearly exclusively in cyberspace. These new 
weapons are unique in that they can simultaneously be more powerful and weaker than the 
weapons orthe conventional terrorist. This apparent dichotomy exists because the laws of 
physics do not operate in cyberspace in the same manner as the physical world. A 
" l'aul A. Strassmann, speech Infurmation Terrorism presented at NDU 10 April 
1995, Washington D_C 
20 
(;onventional bomb will have ~ome dfect every time it is explodcd in the real world. A 
software bomb, when exploded in cybcrspacc may have an extraordinary effect the first time 
it is used as it normally exploits an existing weakness in a computer operating system. After 
that weakness has been corrected, an identical software bomb will do no damage to the 
targeted computer or its data 
Several cybel1errorist weapons can have an impact on the networks of today 
and tomorrow 
(I) Viruses One of the most heraldtXI weapons of a cyberterrorist or 
a hacker is the computer virus Computer viruses are programs designed to perfonn at--tions 
not intended by the operator. These actions include erasing or modifying the data in a 
computer's memory or storage "vith or "-"ithout malicious intent. A virus is so named because 
it "lives" within a host system or program and cannot spread without some action, often 
unv.itting (such as using an infected disk), by the system operator. Viruses can be used in an 
attempt to shut down a computer or even hold it hostage. The front page publicity granted 
the "1-fichelangelo virus" every March serves as an example of the publicity power generated 
by hostile virus. This panicular virus was written to check the computer's internal 
clock/calendar and destroy the data on the infected computer on Michelangelo's birthday, 
March 6 The virus was widely pubhci7.tXI when released in 1992. The ease of identifYing and 
removing the !wtichc1angdo virus has resulted in publicity about it nOI attacking computers 
MlCHELANGELO Vrn.I)S FAO"S TO SURFACE: The Michelangelo virus, 
a naS£)' bit of high-teChnology vandalism designed to hreak out each year on 
2 1 
March 6, the great artist's birthday, failed 10 cripple the world ' s computers 
The Michelangelo virus was font-page news in 1992 1 9 
To compete against virus detection and removal programs, virus v.TIters have created a subset 
of the virus, known as a polymorphic virus. This type of virus changes itself slightly every 
time it is replicated or executed, thus denying a virus detection program a fixed set of 
"indicators" that the virus ha~ infected a computer. The battle between virus writers and virus 
fighters will continue into the future, with each trying to outsmart the other. The sheer 
explosion in the number of viruses (in 1991 there were approximately 500 known computer 
viruses, by 1995 that numbcrcxpanded to more than 5,000) is evidence of this threat,2<J This 
exponential growth suggests that virus writers hold the initiative in the battle for cyberspace 
For existing operating systems that are infected with viruses, a cure cannot be developed until 
the virus is released into the system, Once released, the virus can be studied to find a method 
to prevent its further spread and remove it from the system. The computer community is 
striving to regain the initiative by developing operating systems that are more resistant to 
viruses Despite these developments, those that attack computer systems will generally hold 
lhe initiative 
(2) Trojan Horses. The second type of weapon is a trojan horse, True 
to its name, it is a program that does not appear to be destructive but releases a second 
program 10 perform a task unintended by the system operator, A trojan horse can be used 
19Briefi ng, Denver Post R March 1995 Business, C-2, Nexis 
lO"PreventiOIl Beats Cure for T encinal Illnes~es. Computer Viruses," Daily 
Telegraph (London) , 30 May 1995, 26 
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to install a password "sniffer" program that collect~ the passwords of valid users and stores 
them for later use by an intruder posing as a legitimate user. Cyberterrorists can utilize this 
type of weapon for espionage to gain the iufonnation needed to access a system by 
impersonating legitimate users, thus compounding the problem of intrusion detection. 
(3) Worms. Worms are programs originally developed to travel 
through systems and perform mundane tasks, such as data collection or erasure of old data 
Wllile thl)' can be useful, if misprogrammed or programmed with maliciou~ intent, they can 
be extraordinarily destructive. A virus attaches itself to a host program, but a worm is 
designed to spread across a computer network independently. While noonally programmed 
to penoon a ta~k on a network, a wonn may also simply replicate itself on target computers 
while it continues to spread across a nl'1work. The Morris worm discussed in Chapter IV 
serves as an example of the damage a "non-malicious" wonn can cause 
(4) Humans Computer operators are the vehicles by which viruses, 
trojan horses, and wonns arc initially programmed and then insertl>d into computer systems 
III addition to utilizing software attacks on a computer system, a cyberterrorist or hacker can 
attack a computer system through the vulnerability of its operators. The hacker community 
commonly refers to this a~ "social engineering,"'! Using a social engineering tactic, a 
cyberterrorist may impersonate a computer technician and call individuals within the targeted 
'l Ira Winkler, "Case Study: Social Engineers Wreak Havoc," inlnfoWarCon '95 
Conference Proceedings, September 7-lJ, 1995, by National Computer Security 
Association (Carlisle PA: NCSA, 1995), F-l 
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organization to obtain information to penetrate a system. Once in possession oflegilimate 
log on information, cybertcrrorists will have "legal" access to a system and can insert viruses, 
trojan horses, or worms to expand their control of the system or shul it down 
(5) Electro-Magnetic Pulse Weapons_ v.'hiIe not nearly as widespread 
as viruses, there exists a class of weapons that destroy computers and electronics through an 
electromagnetic pulsen The capability now exists to generate an instantaneous 
electromagnetic pulse that will overload and destroy the sensitive circuitry in advanced 
electronics and computer systems without the previously required detonation of nuclear 
weapons in the upper atmosphere. Any system that is within the limited range of these 
weapons will be dismpted or have its electronic components destroyed. \""hile there have 
been reports of the military using such weapons in the GuJfWar, there are no indications that 
any terrorist organization possesses or has used these weapons against computer targets 2-! 
Press reports from Japan indicate that the AUM Shinrikyo cult, incriminated in the sarin gas 
attacks on Tokyo's subway was attempting to develop a high powered microwave weapon, 
ostensibly for use against humans. 2-< While suspected of being powerful enough to incinerate 
a human body, they may have intended this weapon for use against electronic targets as well 
n James W Rawles, "High-Technology Terrorism,' Defense Electronics, January 
1990,74 
2li\eil Munro, "Microwave Weapons Stuns Iraqis,' Defense News, 15 April 1992, 
Kexis 
l'Yomiuri Shimbun, 'Aum Linked with Microwave Weapons," The Daily Vomiuri, 
I t June 1995, Kexis 
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An electromagnetic weapon docs not leave a crater like a conventional bomb, nor does it 
modify the operating system of a computer. As such, detection of an attack becomes more 
difficult These weapons have been named HERF (High Energy Radio Frequency) Guns and 
ErvIPfT (ElectroMagnetic Pulse Transfonner) Bombs by Winn Schwartau in testimony before 
Congress)) In the same manner as a fertilizer homh can he assembled by a conventional 
terrorist, a cyberterrorist can manufacture an E'MPIT bomh out of readi ly available electrical 
and electronic components 
5. Technoterrorism 
Technoterrorism is the intermediate step between "conventional" terrorism and 
"cyberterrorism " The technoterrorist understands the importance of high technology 
networks and C2 systems to a "third wave" state. Unlike thc cyberterrorist, the 
technoterrorist will ta:-get and attack those systems that clOst in the physical world to disrupt 
cyberspace Thus, the computer itself (hardware rather than software) is the target of the 
technoterrorist The technotcrrorist will usc "conventional" weapons such as bombs and 
physical destruction to destroy or disable those systems that control cyberspace 
6. Terrorism 
The debate over the definition of terrorism is as old as the tenn itself. As the world 
moves into the i.nfonnation age, expanding the definition of terrorism to include actions taken 
inside cyberspace as well as the physical world may be necessary_ There are several elements 
ljSchwartall, J 7 J -189 
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that run through the many defmitions of terrorism. The first critical clement is physical 
violence. At some point in terrorism, an individual or group must believe that they are being 
threatened with violence. The second clement is the political nature of terrorism. The 
violence caused by a terrorist action must have some larger political goal than the physical 
action itself The debate sUrTounding the defInition of terrorism is addressed in Appendix E, 
which contains an overview of some of the more popular definitions in the literature, An 
understanding of the violent and political elements of terrorism are most important for this 
study 
One of the popular selling points of infonuation warfare is that it is a less violent and 
destructive form of warfare in which the combatant states wage war with electrons in 
cyberspace, WIllie the ahility of states to wage relatively hloodless war is yet to be seen (the 
Persian Gulf war began to approach this standard in lenus of allied casualties), the potential 
to create mass chaos and insecurity in a society via information warfare techniques may 
appeal to terrorists, As discussed in Chapter III, the definition of terrorism must be adapted 
and applied to those events that extend beyond mere physical violelll.;e and include what can 
be called ·'cyberviolence," Of violence in cyberspace, where electrons, not people Me 
destroyed In addition, disruption, not destruction must be included as a tool to be utilized 
by cyberterrorists 
The evolving concept of information wartare will influence terrorism in the 
information age Every advance in computing power continues to increase the usefulness of 
computers and theif associated networks to law-abiding citizens. Simultaneously, these 
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computers increase the power ofthe weapons available to cyberterrorist and criminals. The 
Implications of computer technology'~ dual nature, as bolh a tool and weapon, must be 
understood in the information age The military information warfare tactics that exploit this 
dual nature may be used against the United States by future cyberterrorists. As such, it is 
important to include information warfare as a potential component of information age 
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ill. THE SHl1'TING NATURE OF TERRORISM 
A. TOWARD cynERTERROR; rHE SHWrING NATURE OF TE RRORISM 
1. Defining Terror 
How should traditional :-lotions of h:rrorism bl;; modified to accommodate the new 
phenomena of cybertenorism? An answer to this question ',viII be provided by examining the 
compo:J.ents of Thomas Perl)' Thomton's definition of terror: "a symbolic act designed to 
influence political behavior by c;.;.tranormal means, entailing the usc or threat ofviolence"2(' 
Symbolic Violence 
Tel rorism, it is often noted, is the weapon of the weak against thc strong 
Terror is utilized to overcomc seemingly insurmountable odds facing terrorists if they were 
to pursue their cause with conventional military means. Terrorists will typically strikc out 
against targt:ts that will resonate with the group they wish to influence, Thornton states that 
"the relatively high efficiency ofterTOrism derives from its symbolic nature. If the terrorist 
comprehends that he is seeking a demonstration effect, he will attack targets with a maximum 
symbolic value ,>27 While Thornton is primarily concerned with insurgency, the value of 
attacking a symbolic target is applicable to ttrrorism, As an even weaker entity than the 
26Thomas Perry Thornton, "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation," in Inlernal 




revolutionary, the terrorist must strike out against symbolic targets in hopes of gaining 
publicity and garnering support for a cause, If the cause is the eventual overthrow of the 
govemment, then the terrorist must attempt to build this support into an effective insurgency 
Thornton continues to state that the most important symbolic targets for a terrorist/insurgent, 
" are those referring to the normative structures and relationships that constitute the 
supporting framework of the socicty,,,·1 If these symbolic targets are destroyed, then the 
insurgent has succeeded in isolating individuals from the society in which they formerly felt 
SC1.:ure and protected. In the information age, some of the structures that constitute the 
'"supporting framework" of society arc likely to be the high technology networks that allow 
individuals to communicate, access their money, and be employed. Thus, they are ideal 
targets for symbolic violence 
The intention of the terrorist or insurgent must be used to evaluate the 
"s)ffilbolic" nature of the chosen target, Intent drives the symbolism, An examination of the 
intent helps to differentiate between simple crime, which already exists in both the physical 
world and cyberspace, and terrorism. Philip Karber highlights this distinction 
The symbolic concept of terrorism provides two crucial distinctions between 
terrorism and revolution and between terrorism and other forms of violence 
If the objective of violence is the acquisition of useful objects (money, 
weapons, etc.) or the denial of such resources from the enemy, this action is 
robbery, assassination, sabotage, etc,,; "if, on the other hand, the objective is 
s)'lTIbolic expression, we arc dealing with terror"(Thomton), This highlights 
the distinction hetween terrorism and revolution, for symbolic violence can be 
used not only to propagandize the overthrow of a system, but also as a means 
~tThomton, 77 
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of interest articulation to effect the system' s output When the 
"estahlislunent" is unwilling 10 listen 10 nonviolent protcst, terrorism permits 
the frustrated communicator, as staged by one terrorist, "to maximize 
significance and minimize gt--ning caught ,,19 
The cases examined in Chapter IV highlight the ability of criminals to perpetrate crime in 
cyberspace, aBthat remains for terrorism to foHow is a shift in the intent of the actors 
I'hrough information warfare attacks, cyberterrorists can utilize non-physical 
symbolic violence to aniculate their message_ Cyberterrorists can now manipulate a mass 
communication medium to convey a message directly, rather than relying on potentially 
incorrect or "slanted" reporting of an act of symbolic violence The increasing ability to reach 
millions of individuals directly on the Intcrnet Of via a Direct Broadcast Satellite system olTers 
"frustrated communicators" a non-violent alternative route to publicity 
Alex P Schmid divides the symbolic value of terrorist acts into two separate 
caregones The first, denOIGtlvc , categorizes those events that arc "specificaHy and literally 
referring to a:l object or event_" The second category, metaphorical, refers to a target that 
stands for "something other than what it appears to bc"J{I 111ese 1\'0'0 distinctions will become 
increasingly "fuzzy" in the third wave if a state's high technology networks (upon which it 
relies for national security, wealth, and connectivity) become the target of terrorists The 
l'iphilip A Karber, "Orban Terrorism: Baseline Data and Conceptual Framework," 
Social Sdencc QuaYler!y (Vol. 52, Dec. 1971 ) 527-528 as cited in AJex P_ Schmid, 
Political Terrorism (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1983),83 
JOAlex P Sciunid, Poli/lral TerrOrism (New Brunswick Transaction Books, 
1983),83 
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goals of the terrorist may be to gamer attention (metaphorical) and weaken some economic 
or defense system (denotative) through attacking a neTWork 
b. Influence on political behavior 
The second element of Thornton 's definition is that terror is an "act designed 
to influence political behavior " This portion of the definition focuses on political terrorism 
vice other forms, such as criminal or pathological terrorism While no universally ac(;epted 
definition for terrorism exists in the literature, political terrorism is concerned with changing 
the actions of either the incumbent regime (insurgent terrorism), other groups (vigilante 
terrorism), or the population at large (regime or state terrorism).3l The introduction of 
information warfare techniques will affect the conduct of all three types of terrorism but not 
the terrorist 's intention to influence political behavior 
Extranormality 
The cxtranormality of terrorist means and targets is critical to understanding 
the effectiveness of terrorist violence. Schmid states that, "normal occurrences lead to 
standardized responses and coping mechanisms. Terrorist violence breaks the pattern of 
normal human actions. "3~ It is precisely because terrorist actions fall so far outside the 
"norm" of violence accepted in society that they generate such an extraordinary reaction 
Schmid identifies five elements of extranormality: the weapon, the act, the time and place, 
cOven and clandest ine nature, and violation of rules of conduct 
llAlex P. Sclunid, Violence as Communication, (Beverly Hills Sage, 1982), 60 
31Schmid, Political Terrorism, 107 
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(I) The Weapon Terrorists have a long history of utilizing 
'common" weapons such as knives, guns, and bombs to commit acts that exist outside the 
realm of accepted behavior (murder, assassination, airline and embassy bombings). These 
weapons take on new dimensions in the minds of the victims and target i:ludienee. The fear 
of the t.:nknown and the increasing potential of terrorists utilizing Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD), as evidenced by the sarin gas attacks in Tokyo, produces terror as a 
result of such powerful weapons being controlled by a sub-state, non-sanctioned actor. As 
the infonnation age arrives, the possession of infurmation warfare skills by smaller and smaller 
groups ofindividuab may signal the arrival ofa new \\,MD, a Weapon of Mass Disruption, 
in which hoth the state and sub-state actors are equally equipped to inflict this disruption 
(2) The Act, While the use of chemical weapons and the destruction 
ofhuildings has been commonplace in the "normal" n:alm of state on state warfare, gassing 
civi lians in a subway and the destruction of an embassy, airplane, or federal building with a 
bomb clearly lies outside the bounds of accepted, and even criminal, behavior, Since a 
cyberterrorist act has yet to he committed, the first act will , by definition, be outside the 
bounds of the normal. At the vel)' least, it will be unique 
(3) The Time and Place The third extranonnal element is the time 
and place of the attack In terrorism, there is no "declaration of war" between two states that 
prepares the population for violence bern'een the state and an enemy _ Thus, a terrorist attack 
is usually a "bolt from the blue," designed to create terror in the target audience due, in pan, 
to its unexpectedness. As Schmid states 
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The place of the terrorist act is also unpredictable. There are no frontlines, 
there is no battlefield . The sudden outbreak of violence can occur at home, 
during a sportive event or in a cinema, in a barroom or on the 
marketplace-places which have the character of zones of peace. The contrast 
between the famil iar surroundings and the violent disruption enhances the 
fear. Their is a sporadic, irregular pattern to the violence, whereby no one can 
be really certain that he is not facing imminent danger the very next moment 
The thought where and when the next attack will take place and who will be 
the victim is on everybody's mind of those who belong to the targets of 
terrorJJ 
r he ability LO stage an attack nearly anywhere is an clement that will become increasingly 
important in the information age If terrorists wish to attack a state's key networks utilizing 
information warfare methods, they will be able, from one location, to attack either pans of 
the system or the entire system itself. The "no rrontlines or battlefield" situation is already 
reality in "cyberspace" where there arc no borders. Using information warfare methods for 
attack allows a terrorist on the other side of the world to pose the same level of threat as one 
in the room next door 
(4) Covert and Clandestine Nature This applies equally to insurgent 
and state terrorism An insurgent terrorist group must, by design, remain coven and 
clandestine to continue to operate. The dawn of the information age presents new tools for 
a terrorist organization to communicate securely with its members while simultaneously 
enhancing the clandestine nature of the group. Additionally, the information age provides 
another set of tools to the anti-terrorist forces for use against the terrorist 
"Schmid, Political Terrorism, 108 
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(5) Violation of rules of conduct. Coupled with the lack of a 
battlefield or front line is the lack of any mles of engagement or laws of war_ The Geneva 
Convention does not apply to terroris ts or their victims Schmid again highlights the effect 
this has on individual~ 
The adherence to social nonns in human interactions makes behavior 
predictable and thereby contributes to a sense of security. Whenever 
manmade violence occurs we look for a rcason and gcocrally find it in a 
breakdown of th.: actor-victim rdationship_ Tht: terrorist, however, has 
generally not had such a relationship at alL The victim is often not his rcal 
opponent, hI;.': is only an object to activate a relationship with his opponent 
The instrumcnlalization of human beings for a cause of which they arc not 
pan in a conflict in which th.:y are often not active participants strikes many 
observers as extranOlll1al l < 
The victims in cyberspace will never "sec" their attacker, nor are they likely to hav.: any 
re lationship with their attackers in the "real" world. Rather, the interaction will occur 
exclusivdy in the anonymous realm of cyberspace 
In summary, the "cx\Tanonnal means" of a terrorist act are designed to prevent 
the victim or the target audience from placing the event into a known framework . The 
inability to classify the thr.:at or d.:vise a solution utilizing nonnal procedures leads to the 
creation of terror. Thornton stat.:s, "knowledge and understanding of the source of danger 
provide the victim with a framework within which he can classify it, relatc it to his previous 
experience, and therefore take measures to countcr it,,3\ If the cause of the danger is 
unknowable and unpredictable (i.e. , caused "randoml~/' by terrorists), a state of anxiety, 
J4Schrnid, Political Tefforism, 109 
3'Thomton, 83 
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characterized, "by fear of the unknown and unknowable" will be achieved. If the threat is 
great enough, the result is a slate of despair characterized by the perception of the threat as 
"so great and unavoidable that there is no course of action open to him that is likely to bring 
relief"'" As the reliance on computerized systems for the conduct of everyday life increases, 
the level of disruption and disorientation that would be caused by their failure also increases 
Violence 
The final element of Thornton's definition of terror, 'entailing the use or threat 
of violence" deserves close attention as the ability to threaten or use physical ... iolence in 
cyberspace is nonexistent. Thornton bluntly slates that, "a nonviolent program could hardly 
qualify as lerrorism,,31 Unfortunately, the varying definitions of violence in the literature on 
terrorism are second only to the varying definitions ofterrorism itself A critical component 
of most definitions is that violence entails physical harm to a person or objcct Paul 
Wilkinson's definition is a good representation of the "physical" school: 
lVJiolence is defmed as the illegitimate usc or threatened usc of coercion 
resul ting, or intended to result in, the death, injury, restraint or intimidation 
of persons or the destruction or seizure of property. J' 
As terrorism moves into the information age, the definition of violence must include 
cyberviolence. \Vhile the destruction of data is not a physically violent act, and will not 
l'Thornton, 80-81. 
l1Thornton 75 
'"Paul \Vilkinson, Terrorlsm and the Liberal State (New York New York UP, 
1986),24 
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always p\a.;e a human life in jeopardy, it should still be treated as terrorism If the goal of the 
cybertenorist is to create terror, the best course ofaetion may be to resQn to a physically 
violent act, or attack a computer system that will place lives in immediate jeopardy, such as 
aircraft control systems_ If cyberterrorists arc unable to create the perception of a physical 
risk to their audience, they v.~11 be unahle to create a sense of terror rhey may, however, be 
able to fu lfill several other objectives of terrorism 
2. Objectives of Terrorism 
Thornton addresses several objectives in his examination of terror as a weapon The 
fi rst objective is morale-building within the terrorist group The second objective is 
advertising, in which the group attempts to JlUlounce its existence and place its concerns 
before the target audience . Terrorists have historically used tltis "propaganda orthe dted" 
to force debate on their goals_ The recent bombing of the Murrah Federal building in 
Oklahoma City is an example of how a symbolic target can force debate on i~suts far afield 
from the actual terrorist event, In this case, not only the building (which housed numerous 
federal agencies), b\lt the date (anniversary of the resolution of the Waco, TX standoff 
between the BATF and the Branch Davidians) were symbolic_ The symbolic nature of the 
attack riveted the nation's attention on the subsequent Waco and Ruby Ridge hearings in 
Congress and re-ignited a controversy over the conduct of several government law 
enforcement agencies 
When attempting to change the government through an insurgency, another objective, 
according to Thornton, becomts critical to the ttrrorist 
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Disorientation is the objective par excellence of the terrorist, removing the 
underpinnings of the order in which his targets live out their daily lives The 
primary responsibility of any incumbent group is to g'.larantee order to its 
population, and the terrorist will attempt to disorient the population by 
demonstrating that the incumbent's structure cannot give adequate support 
rhe demonstration is, however, but one aspect of the disorientation 
process_ On a much deeper level, the objective is the isolation of the 
individual from his social context The ultimate of the terrorization 
process, as Hannah Arendt conceives it, is the isolation of the individual, 
whereby he has only him~c1f upon whom to rely and cannot draw strength 
from his customary social supports_l9 
If the infonnation age continues to crcate a society that is dependent on computers for 
communication and basic order, the di~ruption of these computers will be critical for the 
creation of disorientation. A government must ensure that those systems upon which it relics 
to maintain order and control are adequately defended against attack by terrorists and 
insurgents In the United States, where 95% of the communications needs of the military are 
carried on the Public Switched Network (PSN), composed entirely of commercial carriers 
such as AT&T and MCl, it has been difficult to determine the proper role of the govenunent 
in ensuring the security of these systems'" 
A final objective of a terrorist organization is provoking a response by the incumbent 
group. Terrorists cannot directly control the government response to an act of symbolic 
violence. Often, a terrorist organization will commit a violent act in hopes that the 
govemment will over-react in its response While there may be pressure to "do something'· 
39-yhomton, 83 
"'Neil Munro, "The Pentagon's New Nightmare: An Electronic Pearl Harbor," 
Washington Post, 16 July 1995, C-3 
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against the terrorists, the terrorist organization can only start the process of government 
action, not control it. As such, thc govcTTlInent must take care not to play into the hands of 
the terrorist organization by over-responding 
Ideally, suppression should be accomplished by rourine methods of law 
enforcement, but ifthe terrorists are effective---and especially ifthe incumbents 
perceive themselvcs to be in a crisis situation-it is almost inevitable that 
extraordinary repressive measures will be taken. In combating an elusive 
terrorist, the im:umbents wi ll be forced to take measures that affect not only 
the terrorist but also his environment, the society as a whole'l 
The repressive nature oflhe countermeasures on society as a whole lead to a confirmation of 
the terrorist's statements against incumbents In attempting to punish the terrorists, the 
government often punishes the people, leading to further disorientation and a fixation of 
blame onto the incumbents for the terrorist actions. This action-repression spiral is a key 
component of a terrorist group seeking to cause government overreaction 
The terrorist and government al-"tions may, however, have the exact opposite effect 
from that just discussed . Ted Robert Gurr has labeled the negative aspects discussed by 
Thornton "backlash"u When a terrorist commits a violent act, there is always a risk that the 
action will he seen as so completely unacceptable that support from within the group will be 
withdrawn. This phenomenon also exists outside the group. The general population will 
blame the terrorist and not the government for their suffering and will tolerate, if not 
"Thornton, 86-8 7 
"'Ted Robert Gun, 'Terrorism in Democracies: Its Social and Political Bases," in 
Origins o/Terrorism: Psychologie~·, Ideologies, Theologies, States o/Mind, ed. Walter 
Reicb (New York Cambridge university Press, 1990),94 
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welcome, repressive measures to eradicate the terrorists. Terrorists may ameliorate this 
problem through the use of cybenerror, in which they can attack symbolic targets in 
cyberspace without the need to kill "innoccnts" in the physical world. Destroying a computer 
or its data is unlikely to elicit the same emotional reaction as killing children 
All of the above can be summarized in the concept of the "tactical path" (Figure 2) 
that both the government and a terrorist group mu~1 follow This concept, postulated by Dr 
f Tactical Path _ I 1.';' _'7'-~ .- ~.~."~ 





Gordon McCormick of the Naval Postgraduate School, states that there is both a V mr. 
(minimum level of violence) and a V nux (maximum level of violence) that is acceptable to \) 
the terrorist group's members and supporters, 2) society at large (the target audience). Ifa 
terrorist organization falls below the V"",,, then it ..... illiose its "place in the spotlight" and be 
relegated to the level of a nuisance or petty crime that is not worthy of the emotionally and 
politically charged term terrorism If a terrorist group crosses the V mo,,, then it will experience 
backlash, losing support from within and raising the level of repression that the government 
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can usc to defeat the terrorist group The government's tactical path is similarly bounded 
If it fpJis below the V",,,, the public will perceive it as not responding to thc terrorist situation 
If the government response exceeds the V,""" the public will perceive it as unduly repressive, 
thereby fulfilling one ofthc terTOrist's main objectives of provoking an excessively harsh and 
represSlVe countermeasures campalgn 
While cyberviolence enables the terrorist to attack symbolic targets without resorting 
to physical violence, there is likely a similar "tactical path" for cyberviolcnce. The critical 
difference between cyberlerror and conventional terror is disruption vice destruction. As 
such, the bounds of the !\-\'O tactical paths are different. If terrorists use cyberviolencc to kill 
individuals (through failure of critical computer controlled safety systems) the public will 
evaluate their actions on the conventional terrorism "tactical path" since the results of the 
action include rlestTu,,'tioll If the event causes disruption exclusively, it will then be evaluated 
on a cyberterrorist tactical path. While the upper and lower bounds of each path are 
somewhat fluid, a generalllnderstanding of the limits is possible. The V...,. of cybenerrorism, 
judged in the number of people disrupted, is likely to be an order of magnitude greater than 
that of conventional terrorism in which people are killed. While several events, such as the 
shutdown of Japanese rail systems and the Internet (discussed in Chapter IV) disrupted 
millions of people, both the public and government responses were muted in comparison to 
the sarin gas attacks on the subways in Japan and the bombing of Pan Am 107 over 
Lockerbie. Vole have not yet seen a group cross the V....,. on the cyberterror tactical path. 
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3. Ability to Cause Terror From Cyberspace 
Information warfare attacks can be a fonn of symbolic violence but can they create 
terror? We have seen that the components of symbolic violence are many and varied, with 
the critical target for insurgents being the social system of their target audience. In 
conventional terrorism one of the main objectives ofa terrorist act is the creation terror. This 
is best done by removing individuals from society and placing them in some form of physical 
Jeopardy_ Do information warfare tactics and techniques offer a terrorist the ability to do both 
at once? The exploding reliance on computers and telecommu:llcations in the "third wave" 
world have created a definite vulnerability in the information age 
The sinews of the post-industrial society are already taking shape - the 
network of electronic data-processing and communications - and these sinews 
are already becoming more vulnerable to disruption and terrorism, The 
service industries, in particular, are increasingly inter-independent, and ripe for 
attack by fraudsters, hackers, eavesdroppers, disrupters, and extortionists,4) 
Indeed, the actions of hackers have left no doubt about the vulnerability of the world's 
computer systems President Bush addressed this vulnerability at the highest levels of the 
us. govenunent with the release of National Security Decision Directive 42 in 1990 
Telecommunications and infonnation processing systems are highly 
susceptible to interception, unauthorized access, and related forms of technical 
exploitation as well as other dimensions of the foreign intelligence threat. The 
technology to exploit these electronic systems is widespread and is used 
extensively by foreign nations and can be employed, as well, by terrorist 
groups and crinrinal elements« 
')Richard Clutterbuck, Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare: Forecasts and Remedies 
(New York Routledge, 1990) 18 
"Schwartau, 127 
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The capability clearly exist~ to target the new "sinews" of our computer networked society 
As e\~denced by the :\lorris worm attack, it requires no external state support, Rather than 
belog hea,,'ily dependent on money, people, and force in the manner of conventional terrorism, 
it is primarily dependem on infonnation and knowledge of how to penetrate systems 
In the in:ormation age, the value of our networks to national security, goverrunent, 
and business is increasing at an exponential rate. Our financial networks, which move trillions 
of dollars a day, are an often cited example of the damage a terrorist allack on them would 
cause 4l This ability to move money electronically is vital to our economic weU being and is 
a symbol of United States wealth and power. In the saffle way that U S, embassy buildings 
and civilian aircraft were attacked as symbolic target~ in the 70s and 80s, the networks that 
are the manifestation of US economic and political strength may become target~ in the 
future. That the networks are vulnerable and a symbolic target does not automatically dictate 
that they will become targets of terrorist organizations Rather, the efficiency with which 
these targets can cause fear, anxiety, and despair through terror will dictate when, if ever, 
terrorists will attack them 
ferror is a psychological ~tate that can be sparked through physical acts The "use 
or threat of violence" in the definition of terror as forwardcd by Thornton exists exclusively 
in the physical world and does not "exist" in the same form in cyberspace. Terrorists can 
achieve the goal of disorientation at an individualleve1, "by physically withdrawing the 
"Schwartau, 64 
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individual from his envirorunent and isolating him (as in "brainwashing" techniques)_" Since 
a terrorist organization cannot isolate each person in its target audience, it uses symbolic 
violence in an attempt to destroy the social fi-amework of society so that the individual thinks 
he is alone in his aJ1b'llish even though he may be physically undisturbed _46 
In the information age, relationships are increasingly being built upon the "Global 
Network" This may give rise to the popular concept ofa "Global Village_" Communities 
ofinclividuals separated by thousands of miles and state borders are springing up every day 
These <'virrual communities" only exist through the "cyberspace" connection afforded by new 
communications and computing technology, These communities are an ideal target for 
isolation by "cybenerrorists," While isolating the members of these communities from eaeh 
other temporarily is possible for a terrorist group, the members are likely to have ties to a 
local community that provides their primal)' "social framework,,,n If the members of the 
group relied entirely on their virtual community for their social framework, however, then a 
small group of people could effectively achieve the goal of disorientation \vithin that vinual 
community as its members are already physically separated from one another. Removing their 
"cyberspace" ties with one another is an effective way to begin their isolation. Depending on 
how terrorists carry out the disruption of connectivity between the members, it could last for 
several hours, days, or weeks, \Vith the increasing redundancy of telecommunications assets, 
'6Thomton, 83 
"Martin Libicki, The Mesh and the Net (Washington, D,C Institute for National 
Strategic Studies, 1994), 97- 119 
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it is unlikely that service would be disrupted for more than this period of time. The same 
disruption of service may occur through "natura]" means, (fire, flooding, natural disaster) and 
would cause some concem within the community but would not create terror, That the same 
end resu:t (disruption of service) does not produce the same psychological reaction is based 
on the individual's perception of the problem, The disruption and isolation generated by 
"natural causcs" fits readily within the victims' cognitive framework allowing them to take 
actions to overcome their difficulties. If a terrorist organization covertly causes a low level 
of disruption, the citiz.ens ufthe virtual community will not be able to classify the threat or 
they will classify the threat as the actions of "hackers," petty criminals, or as a government 
conspiracy. Only when the level of disruption escalates and cannot be controlled or 
understood by the "virrual citizens," will terrorists create anxiety and despair. For a 
cyberterrorists 10 be taken seriously, they must cause massive damage to their "cybertargets" 
to avoid the attack being evaluated within the public's known framework If the terrorist 
wants to perform a "sofi-kill" on a major system, the amount of information (hard to ohtain) 
required is extraordinary while the amount of equipment (easy to obtain) is minimal. While 
it is more "elegant" 10 bring down a ~ystem with no visible signs through programming, it 
islar easier to bomb a "key node" in the computer system with explosives to disahle jg 
power or information flow. The networks connecting virtual communities arc lucrative 
targets because they span conventional country borders and exist exclusively in cyberspace 
4S 
fhe "control" of cyberspace is a seam in U.s society that a terrorist organization can 
exploit The uproar generated by the U.s. government's proposal to mandate a specific 
hardware encryption method (the Clipper chip for telephones), which would still allow for 
government surveillance, highlights the lack of popular government solutions to problems 
in cyberspace In addition, the government dismantled the National Science Foundation 
network (3 majOr Internet backbone) in April 1995. Commercial service providers have taken 
over the services provided by the NSFNet." While in the past, access \0 the Internet was 
nearly exclusively via educational, government or scientific institutions, at present, 
commercial connections and "host" computers are growing rapidly. The commercial (com) 
domain is the fastest growing sector of the Internet over the last two years and the growth 
continues at an exponential rate.·9 
Since cyberspace is essentially uncontrolled by any government or individual, a 
question of who is responsible for its defense will be asked in the wake of sustained attacks 
tfno satisfactory answer is provided, the terrorists may be able to shift the target audience's 
anger toward the group (most likely the government) that they believe should be responsible 
for maintaining the security of cyberspace. Since the virtual community will most likely span 
several different countries, the opponunity exists for a terrorist to affect a worldwide target 
audience and achieve maximum impact for minimum dIan 
43Cymhia BoumeUis, "Internet '95," In/ernel World, November 1995, 52 
4"Boumellis,47 
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\Vhile "cybercommunities" are v1l1nerable to information warfare attack, can terrorists 
influence US society al large via Information Warfare? Can they lruly create terror by 
exploding software bomb~ instead orrertilizer bombs? The answer may lie in the increasing 
levels of computerization in everyday life and the blind faith that is coming to be placed in 
computers. The importance of these computers is discussed by \vinn Schwartau 
In J 968, Marshall McLuhan said that emerging information networks arc 
"direct extensions" of our own nervous systems_ Losing an ATM machine, 
according to that reasoning, is the equivalent of a leg or an arm. People panic 
when the ir computer goes down. 50 
A terrorist blowing up or hijacking an ai rp lane has a definite impact on the public. It is a 
media event that is widely publicized and speculation runs rampant over who co mmitted the 
crime and for what reason. It is likely to cause fear in the public and perhaps anxiety in ~ome 
Some travelers may, due to their fear, opt not to use air transportation. In the majority of 
cases, the act of blowing up the airplane is not meant to punish the passengers, or even to 
deter air travel, but rather it is a symbolic act meant to bring the terrorist issue in to the 
forefront of the media and thus, the world 's attention To create terror in the general public, 
there must be some perceived threat of violence The large percentage of the population that 
has, and will, use air transportation can identify with the passeng~rs who are killed in a plane 
bombing. T hey begin to ask, "Am T next?" and "Do I have any control over this situation?" 
Whi le McLuhan may have been right in saying thaI networks are becoming an extension of 
our nervous systems, it is unlikely that individuals will value them as highly as anns or legs 
lL'Schwartau, 77 
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When one or many ATMs go down, there is little hope of terror heing created as a resul t 
There is no threat to the physical well being of the ATM user. This situation, if caused by 
cybenerrorists, may cause anger and frustration, but causing terror is unlikely, If, on the 
other hand, A TM machines started to electrocute their users on a seemingly random basis, 
it may provoke a sense of terror in the ATM user community 
In an unlikely twist of fate, the \Vorld Trade Center bombers did cause a large number 
of irxlividuals to lose access to their money via ATM machines. A major snowstonn on the 
East Coast of the United States caused the roof of Electronic Data Systems (EDS) 
Corporation's New Jersey computer eentdr to collapse, The backup plan for EDS was to 
relocate their operations to an alternate site. Unfortunately, comprunes that the World Trade 
Center bombing displaced were using the EDS backup site. As a result, the ATMs that EDS 
ser,:iced were forced to shut down, affecting 6% of the 83 ,000 teller machines in the linited 
States, While damaging to EDS, the individual bank customer lost no data or money. Tn fact, 
the redundancy of the ATM communications system, with many machines being served by 
~everal different net,vorks (plus, Cirrus, etc,), 98% of those affected by the EDS outage had 
alternate access to their money via a different network 11 The loss of ATMs, while not 
directly intended by the homhers, did not cause massive prunc or a run on any banle The 
flexibility and redundancy of the existing networks, although individually vulnerable to 
disruption, were sufficient to allow the flow of money to continue 'without major interruption 
"Rusty Graham, "Storm, Bombing Work 1-2 Punch on Local ATMs," Temple 
Daily Telegram, 18 March 1993, Business section, Nex.is 
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This incident highlights the difficulty that a technotcrrorist may face in the future ,vith the 
increasing redundancy and mUltiple networking of '.ita] systems. When one or several nodes 
are destroyed, the signals normally processed by that node are simply rerouted to another 
node to reach their destination. With the increasing reliance on centralized switching in the 
telephone industry, the loss of just one switch can have widespread effects, as demonstrated 
by the 1988 fin: that destroyed a Chicago area s'.vItch and resulted in the shutdown of O'Hare 
Airport and the loss of telephone service to a widespread area. Should cyberterrorists attack 
several nodes simultaneously, they may be able to create a disruption that would be more 
widespread than the physical destru(.,'tion of just one node. While the cyberdisruption is likely 
to be larger, its effeCI~ will be less pennanent than the phy~ical destruction caused by 
conventional or teclmo-terrorists 
Brian Jenkins highlights the difficulty that information warfare attacks have in 
generating terror 
Will we see a more sophisticated 'white collar' terrorism, that is, attacks on 
telecommunications, data-processing or other targets intended to 
produce not crude destruction but disruption? .Perhaps, but 
disruptive ' terrorism' of this type does not appear to be particularly appealing 
to today's terrorist groups. Such operations are technically demanding, and 
they produce no immediate visible effects. There is no drama. XO lives hang 
in the balance. There is no bang, no blood . They do not satisfy the hostility 
nor the publ icity hunger ofthe terrorists.l 2 
'2Brian Jenkins, '"Future Trends in International Terrorism," Current Perspectives 
In International Terrorism, eds. Robert O. Slater and Michael Stohl (New York St 
Martin's Press, 1988) 258 
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In the future, terrorists may no longer need terrof or physical violence to create the disruption 
and publicity that they desire. While the "kinder and gentler" cybenenorist of tomorrow may 
be able to create disruptions without resorting to conventional destructive tactics, these 
infomlation warfare skills may be used to augment the destructive nature of acts committed 
by conventional terrorists The level of destruction and chaos caused by an act can be 
increased by interfering with the authorities ability to communicate and respond 
Information age terrorism, in its cyberterror form, may be non-violent and not directly 
utilize terror It must, however, be treated as terrorism as it will fulfill nearly all tne other 
objectives of terrorism and poses a serious risk to information dependent societies 
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IV. SHIFT TOWARD [NFO]{i\1ATJON \VARFARE ACROSS nn: CONFLICT 
SPECTRUM 
InfOlmation warfare ta,,1ics are being employed across the spectrum of conflict The 
increasing importance of computers and their attendant networks make them primary targets 
for both state sponsored espionage and crime)) Terrorists have recognized the value of 
ene:-gy distrihution neTWorks and some computer installations. At the level of insurgency and 
rebellion, infonnation warfare tactics have bcen uscd to subvert state controls of the media 
and for communications between the rebcl leadcrship and tht.'ir worldwide support base 
A. USE OF INFORMAUON WARFARE IN ST ATE SPONSORED ~:SPIONAGE 
ANDC RTME 
The advanced infonnation warfare techniques of computer penetration, surveillance, 
and exp loitation developed by the follov.ing states can be utilized for terrorism as well as 
espionage and crime There is a long history of state sponsorship of terrorism in the 20th 
century Often the goal of computer penetrations is to provide easy aecess for future 
penetrations In effcct, fo reign states are conducting infonnation warfare espionage to have 
"tum key" access to US. systems in the future. The only diJYerence between these acts of 
oomputer espionage and terrorism is the addition of a political motive or goal to the criminal 
nature of the penetration States may, in the future, choose to provide this infonnation to a 
Hpeter E. Sakkas, "Espionage and Sabotage in the Computer World," 
international Journal of intelligence and Counterintelligence 5-2 (Summer 19(1): 155-
202 
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sponsored ter rorist group for use against the United States As such, a careful examination 
of past and cunent information warfare activities at the state level is important as it may 
identi£)' future terrorist targets or tactics likely to be used by state sponsored terrorist groups 
Who can perpetrate an organized "computer attack" against the United States? A 
study of the threat by Wayne Madsen addresses these issues He classifies foreign nations 
into one of four categories of computer advancement 
(J) highly advanced, (2) operationally advanced, (3) basic development, and 
(4) initial development. France, the United Kingdom, Japan, China, and the 
United States represent the first category, and their intelligence agencies are 
highly advanced in the science of electronic eavesdropping and computer 
intell igence gathering . Russia, India, Ukraine, and Colombia represent the 
second category While Russia and India, arguably, have first-rate 
intelligence-gathering organizations, their high technology capabilities still lag 
behind those ofthe first category but are improving steadily. Libya, Ghana, 
and Bolivia fall into the third category. Their intelligence agencies will soon 
have high technology capabilities_ Zaire, Ethiopia, and Tanzania represent the 
fourth category: their intelligence organizations lack rugh technology 
capabilities and their embryonic computer and data communications systems 
are vulnerable to the capabilities of the nations in the first three categories 1< 
\Vh.ile this is a comprehensive list of states, the threat continues to grow. This is due to the 
increasing rate of computer power and technology available to sub-state actors, such as 
"hackers." In the past, one needed to have the power and rescurces of a state behind them 
to conduct an effective worldwide SIGINT operation_ Now, a few people can conduct a 
computer intelligence (COMPINT) effort with limited funds_ Whereas access to remote sites 
to place antennas or military overflight of territory was a prerequisite for SIGINT, the most 
"Wayne Madsen, "Intelligence Agency Threats to Computer Security," 
internatIOnal JourfUl/ oj Intelligence and Counterintelligence 6 (V.linter 1993)" 440 
52 
critical clement ofCO:MPfNT is tht: knowledge of how 10 exploit a computer system . As 
cyberspace is a nonphysical reality, borders and geographic location of the target system are 
meaningless in a CO:MPrNT effort. Since the world's computers are becoming increasingly 
interconne(;tcd, a modem to connect to the Internet and a desktop computer, coupled with 
a talented computer user, arc all that is required to start intelligence gathering. With the 
power of desktop computers doubling every 12-18 months, the computing power that 
previously only a govenunent or large corporation could afford now sits in homes across the 
world. While :«ate powers have exploited these assets in the past, subslatc actors may exploit 
them easily in the future 
Who is Targeting the United States? 
Soviet Unjon/Russia 
The first computer hacker incident to garner national attention was sponsored 
in part by the Soviet Union to gain access to Western technology and defense infonnation. 
This incident was the subject ora book, The Cuckoo's Egg, by Clifford Sloll . j~ A group of 
West Gennan hackers, who were operating on their O\.vn, approached the KGB in East Berlin 
and began to sell the "product" of their hacking. Later touted as a "KGB spy ring," the 
hackers attempted to break into scores of military, government, and business computers to 
provide information to the Soviets. While the hackers thought that military items would be 
high Oil the KGB shopping list (some were), most of the requests centered on high technology 
jjClifford Stoll, The CUCkoO'5 Egg: Tracking a Spy Through the Maze of 
Computer Espionage (New York: Doubleday, 1989) 
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computer program:; and equipment design. The Soviets desired the "source code" for 
sophisticated and widely used computer operating systems. With thi:; knowledge, the Soviets 
could create their own team of "hackers" to penetrate systems in the West 
The operating system that runs a computer exists in two Conns, the "source 
code" which a human can read, analyze, and understand when printed, and the "compiled" 
version, which translates the operating system "soun;e code" into "machine language," the 
actual ones and zeros that the computer understands but is completely unintelligible to 
humans. The process of compiling the source code is similar to encryption The machine 
language can be decompiled (decrypted) with the result being only similar, not identical, to 
the source code. Thus, any "source code" is one of a computer prograrruning company's 
most closely held secrets, Knowledge of the "source code" makes it easier for a hostile 
competitor or state to identify what bugs exist in the program or even insert its own bugs, 
recompile the code, and replace the operating :;ystem with their altered version, all without 
the knowledge of the end user. In this manner, the Soviets were attempting to "get the keys 
to the filing cabinet rather than its contents" via their computer hackers. There are indications 
that the Soviet efforts to acquire this infonnation were far more extensive than using the 
"amateur" hackers as their KGB contact told them that they had "competition" and many of 
its desires were met without the hackers providing the product, This knowledge, exploited 
by terrorists, could result in massive disruption of computer :;ystems on a worldwide basis 
The computer penetration attempts by the SovietslRussians continue. Wayne 
Madsen observes that "the Institute of Automated Systems (lAS) in Moscow hosts the 
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National Center for Automated Data Exchanges with Foreign Computer Networks and Data 
Banks (l\'CADE). During Soviet rule, NCADE had a special program to broaden linkages 
between Soviet computer users and foreign data networks and databases to obtain valuable 
software programs that the Soviets could not normally obtain because of Western export 
restrictions, "j~ Using these channels, the Soviets penetrated a German computer and 
obtained production information on the Tornado fighter aircraft: in 1984 , A~ recently as J 989 
a Soviet Attache, LtCol Yuri Pakhutsov, was expelled from the US for allegedly attempting 
to acquire information on government computer security practices and capabilities" While 
the KGB of the Soviet Union was well organized and ran its "information warfare" attacks 
from sc\o-eral directoraWi, the current state of organized Russian computer espionage efforts 
is not clear Statements made by retired Russian intelligence officers, even after the KGB-
Harmover Hacker sp)lng scandal, leave open the possibility that computer espionage efforts 
continue 
Colonel Barkovsky was not hesitant to state that the Russian Federation has 
embarked on a major progranune of establishing information service networks 
throughout the country. Not elaborated upon was whether the Russian 
intelligence services will take advantage of the information-gathering 
capabili ties provided by these nel\",orks,51 
:l«Madsen, 419 
l7"Soviet Attache expelled as 'computer spy',' Jane 's Defence Weekly 18 March 
1989,438 
liWayne Madsen "Retired KGB Officers Refuse Comment on Russian Computer 
Espionage," Computer Fraud and Secuflty Bulletin Jan. 1994, Nexis. 
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One can only a~sume that the Russians are continuing their programs to acquire and target 
high technology in the United States. 
Claire Sterling, in her book The TeTTor Network. claimed that the Soviet Union 
was a major sponsor of terrorism across the world.w While the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union and the economic problems of Russia have clearly limited its ability to fund large 
tenonst operations. the cost involved in sponsoring cybenerrorism is significantly lower. The 
knowledge gained by the Soviets during Cold-War espionage efforts may (with or without 
the approval of the Soviet leadership) find its way into the hands of cyberterrorist 
organizations This flow of information is potentially more damaging than the flow of arms 
and explosives to conventional terrorist o rganizations 
b. Bulgaria 
Bulgaria has been a "breeding ground" for computer viruses during and after 
Communist rule. In the early 199Os, the Bulgarians had developed thirty unique viruses with 
more than 100 different variations and were releasing them at a rate of one per week.6(t The 
"Hannover hackers" of Cuckoo's Egg fame also identifY the Bulgarians as active in computer 
intelligence Madsen cites the National Intelligence Service (foreign and domestic 
intelligence), and Razuznavatelno Upravleniye na Ministerstvoto (RUMNO) (Mlitary 
inleUigence) as the Bulgarian intelligence organizations most likely to be involved in computer 
19C1aire Sterling, The Terror Network (New York: Berkdey, 1982) 
~adsen, "Intelligence Threats" 426 
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intelligence gathering6 1 It has also been rumored that a new "virus library" that allows 
anyone, not just a skilled programmer, to write a virus by "picking and choosing" among 
several options was first developed in Bulgaria. This system has the potential to produce 
thousands of new viruses to be unleashed at random or specific targets A cyberlerrorist bent 
on bringing a system down could singlehanded!y generate a flood of viruses to infect the 
targeted computer. Even if virus detection software was installed, the chances arc good that 
a vinls could be created to evade detection 
France 
France freely admits that it conducts intelligence operations against its allies 
and its enemies on the "economic front. " As we move into the information age, the 
distinction betw(!cn fi-iends and enemies begins to blur. :\'fadsen targets the Direction de la 
Surveillance du Territoire (DST) and the Directorate Generale de 1a Securite Exterieure 
(OGSE) as the agen6es involved in COMPIN1 In addition the Groupement de 
Communications Radio-electriques (GCR), the French NSA, maintains a close working 
relationship with France Telecom and, like the U.s. NSA, has strict rules on the use of 
encryption products within France, allegedly so that they can "break" the encryption and 
eavesdrop on communications within France 
Recently, the French government disclosed a document instructing the DGSE 
to gather intdligence on 49 US aerospace and defense firms. The methods to obtain this 
6]Madsen, 450 
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infonnatioll illcluded bugging of Air France flights and breaking and entering ofhote! rooms 
of visiting business executives to photocopy business materials 6, The Hughes Aircraft 
Company has been a favorite target of the French. The DGSE targeted Hughes for 
infonnation on its HS 601 communication satellite, fiber optic anti-tank weapons, the Phoenix 
AIM-54 air to air missile, and various electro-optical sensorsM The Hughes Corporation 
decided (ostensibly for business reasons) to cancel its attendance at the Paris Air Show after 
the revelations of French targeting Another "aviation" scheme of the French involved the 
collection and exploitation of telemetry signals from a Boeing test flight of its new 747-400 
aircraft A French SIGINT and technical team were sent to Washington state to intercept and 
analyze the test flight data for the benefit of Airbus researchM While not a direct computer 
penetration, the components that the French were most interested in were the computer 
controlled navigation and flight control systems. The knowledge gained from Boeing's 
telemetry data enabled them to develop similar systems for their own aircraft. Additionally, 
should the detailed knowledge of computer controlled aviation systems fall into the hands of 
a technologically sophisticated terrorist organization, the potential to create terror is 
substantial. A terrorist organization would only have to convince the public that it is capable 
6'Michael J. McDermott, "Is International Marketing a game of spy versus spy'!" 
Brandweek 20 June 1994,3 1 
6JRonald E. Yates, "Cold War: Part II, Foreign Intelligence Agencies have New 
Targets- US. Companies," Chicago Tribune, 29 Aug. 1993, C1 
"'Peter Schweizer, FnendlySpies (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1993), 122 
of causing the controls of a particular type of airplane to stop responding to pilot inputs to 
create lar ge concern over flying in that particular type of airplane 
d. Japan 
The Japanese place a high priority on intelligence gathering through hoth 
"official" and corporate intelligence networks_ Japan's international telecom carrier, N"l~r 
"routinely cooperates with Japanese intelligence to tap the phone lines of competitors" In 
addItion, Madsen asserts that the Japanese target u.s satellite communications stations 'A 
1987 classified CIA report, lapan __ Foreign lmelligence and Security Services, claimed that 
the second most important Japanese intelligence priority was the gathering (in many cases hy 
computer) of technological and scientific developments in the United States and Western 
Europe""1 The efforts of Japan in the "high tech" sector an~ not simply related to "computer 
hreak-ins" but rather to acquire design speci£cations in all effort similar to that of the Former 
Soviet Union. Wlnle the Soviets were attempting to ohtain source codes and hardware that 
they were unable to build themselves, the Japanese were working to save money on R&D by 
stealing advanced U S technology and then bringing similar products to market 
simultaneously with their U.S competition Peter Schweizer outlines the story of a corporate 
spy who sold Hitachi copies of IBM's Adirondack Workbooks, a series of books that held the 
secrets to future lI3M technology. Hitachi was able to use this information to develop 
computer hardware that was nearly identical to IBM's but cheaper since Hitachi did not hear 
"'Madsen, 436 
the development costs. This case was "broken" hy a Silicon VaHey "sting" operation run by 
the FIJI that initially targeted the Soviets Japanese aggressiveness in pursuing this 
teclmology led them into the trap The end result was an out of court settlement, reportedly 
for ]00 million dollars between the Japanese and IBM. The information t hat an intelligence 
gathering effort obtains may be used by a sponsored terrorist organization to target a specific 
business or industry 
China 
Chinese intelligence employs its large etlmic community abroad for many 
purposes It is now clear that computer penetration was one of those functions. Andrew 
Wang, a Chinese immigrant, was arrested for stealing the source code of several programs 
from Ellery Systems. These programs were designed \0 "nm" the emerging National 
Information Infrastructure.';'; This source code, as previously discussed, would allow a 
foreign intelligence agency or terrorist group to identify and exploit loopholes in the "new 
information superhighway" that would carry everything from benign E-mail to national 
security data 
j Germany 
The Germans appear to have taken their cue from the success of such amateur 
hacker groups as the "Chaos Club" and the "Hannover Hackers" that worked with the KGB 
According to Schweizer, the Germans created "Project Rahab," named after the biblical 
""Stephen Keating, "Global Intrigue on Info Highway, Local Case Alleges Chinese 
Piracy," Denver Post, 24 April 1994, A I 
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character who helped the Israelites infiltrate Jericho, in the mid 19805 to develop a 
" professional" hacking capability. The project was developed by the Bundes Nacrichtcn 
Dienst's (BND) Chlistia:l Stoessel, who 'wrote the initial "point paper" proposing hacking into 
foreign data bases for intelligence purposes. The project was a joint effon between DND's 
Division I (HUMINT), Division II (SIGINT) and Division IV (l-lQ ). In addition to the 
intelligence proiessionals, other teclmical experts from a variety of outside institutions were 
recrui ted, resulting in a staff of approximately 70 people. While focused initially on retrieving 
infurmation, the Projc<.:t Rahab staff soon turned to offensive measures that could be of use 
in a lime of conflict, including a variety of viruses that could he inserted into target 
computers. Schweizer claims that the Project has "accessed computer systems in the Soviet 
Union, Japan, France, the United States, Italy, and Great Britain."67 Jncluded in the "hacks" 
of the Rahab staff is penetration of the SWIFT network, a dedicated international banking 
network that canies the majority of woridwide bank transfers rhe implications of this 
information falling into terrori~t hands are clear 
g, lmq 
Roth sides waged information warfare, it appears, during the Gulf War A 
Schweizer claims that a major computer penetration effort was launched during Desert Storm 
A Government Accounting Office Report reinforces this claim as it outlines the efforts of 
Dutch hackers to penetrate U.S. unclassified military computers The hackers exploited 
67Schweizer,161 _2 
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several well-known weaknesses and were able to ptmetrate a computer system that directly 
supported Operation Desert Storm While the hackers did not attempt to shut down any of 
the penetrated systems, they did attempt to modify the software to provide easy access in the 
lurure 61 \\'hi.Ie the Dutch ha(;kers have not been publicly linked to Iraqi intelligence efforts, 
a similar incident, involving a German citizen was dete(;ted during the GulfWar.6' 
Lawrence LivemlOre Laboratories were uscd by "hackers" in an attempt to 
find information on the Patriot missile system, In this instance the actions of a thi rd party 
"proxy" for Iraq had the potential to cause damage to the safety of troops on the ground, the 
integrity of air defenses in Israel and thus, cause a weakening of the allied coalition against 
Iraq As Iraq is a known sponsor of terrorist organizations, it may tum to its proxies to carry 
out a cyberterror campaign against the information systems of enemy states 
h. Swiss 
The Swiss, who have a long history in cryptography, may have perpetrated an 
infonnation warfare attack against other nations. The Swiss firm of Crypto AG, which sells 
encryption teclmology and hardware to nations such as Iraq, Iran, Libya and Syria, has been 
accused of "bugging" their crypto equipment and listening in on "encrypted" communications 
Furthermore, it is alleged that the Swiss firm is really owned by the German BND and that 
MGovcmment Accounting Office, Hackers Penetrate DOD C()mputer Systems, 
Statement of Jack L. Brock before Senate Subcommittee on Government Information and 
Regulation. 20 November 1991 ,1 -4. GAOrr-IMTEC-92-S 
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the U S National Security Agency has played a leading role in the bugging 70 While the firm 
has vehemently denied this charge, it raises several interesting information warfare 
possibilities If supposedly "secure" cryplo units were bugged without the knowledge ofa 
client nation, the possibility exists that other computers or items of "high tech" equipment 
have been modified with less than honorable intent , Several stories have appeared on the 
Internet discussing both software and hardware "flaws" distributed in products One such 
flaw disabled a computer program after one month of usc. The possibility exists that a 
program could "lock up" a computer after a certain time period or after it received a certain 
activation command, Computer hardware, such as printers and circuit boards could also be 
shipped with "log ic bombs" in their programs that would cause the equipment 10 cease 
fu nctioning. T he known cases that have been discussed have all been "benign" errors by 
public companies that have been rapidly fixed once identified If, however, a foreign power 
were 10 insert its own bug in the software's source code before shipment and not activate the 
program unti l hostilities were imminent, a substantial portion of an affected computer network 
could be disabled 
Seychelles 
The island nation ofthe Seychelles has undertaken a high technology campaign 
against enemies of its government in England. The nation was able to exploit the British 
telephone system and conduct wiretaps against several targets. The infonnation obtained with 
1o. 'Suspicions Surface About Bugged Swiss Encryption Units," Computer Fraud 
and Securlly Bulletin, October 1994 
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these wiretaps resulted in the assassination of an exiled anti-government leader71 The 
Seychelles demonstrate the potential threat that even a small country can pose to a 
superpower by using information warfare techniques. In the information age, even the 
smallest state or terrorist group has a chance to impact the global network 
Israel 
While not responsible for the creation of the "Friday th.e 13th" virus, (supposedly 
developed by a Palestinian to protest the 40th anniversary of the end of the Palestinian 
mandate) the computer links between Israel's intelligence service and the United States served 
as a cond ui t for the virus to spread to the United States. The Israelis used a "low tech" 
solution to enter u.S. databases- they recruited Jonathan Pollard. While unable to "break" 
DIA's computers, Israel could obtain information that Pollard retrieved from computer 
systems and delivered to his handlers. n This highlights the constant "human" factor in all of 
intelligence. Even if your computer cannot be accessed by any type of modem or network 
and is sitting inside a Tempest approved enclosure, an enemy agent can still physically break-
in, or have an employee access the machine, copy the infonnation from that computer ontO 
a floppy disk and simply walk out of the building with it. Information that would have taken 
a wheelbarrow to get out of a secure facility now fits on a single diskette. While "hackers" 
may not "break into" some of their target computers, they are still able to analyze the type of 
infonnation on the computer and possibly gain some information on the type of hardware and 
7lMadsen,440 
nWolf Blitzer, Tt;rrilory of Lies (New York: Harper and Row, 1989), 68 
64 
operating system that runs the computer. While ihis does not help the hacker, it may allow 
for more "classic" espionage action to be taken by a foreign organization, such as bribing or 
blackmailing someone on the "inside." As Jay Peterzell highlights, "?\SA has figures that 
make the insider threat look soberingly real An agency log of cases involving computer 
crime or computer espionage showed that up to 90% of known security breaches arc the 
work of corporate or government insiders ,,73 
Israel was also involved in halting a second Patriot missile computer hacking 
operation . Israel detained an 1& year old for attacking U,S defense computers to retrieve 
information on the Patriot missile system Charges were not brought against the hacker, 
possibly to downplay the incident and nO! highlight cxisting weaknesses in computer 
security. " 
n. USE OF COMPlJTERS 1111' REVOLUTION 
The use of computers in revolutions highlights the importance of information control 
for authoritarian regimes Without tight control of information flow, regimes cannot control 
the activities of dissidents. Thc increasing interconnection of the world provided by 
computers aliows dissidents to "bring in" the rest of the world_ They instantly broadcast 
atrocities and repression to a worldwide audience, with the attendant publicity often 
preventing a h<tfsh crackdown by government forces 
llJay Peter:l:cll, "Spying and Sabotage by Computer; The US and its adversaries 
are tapping databases--and spreading viruses." Time, 20 March 1989, 25 
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1. Poland 
A 1987 anicle in Datamation examined the use of computers in the Solidarity 
movement in Poland 
Necessity and the spread ofinfonnation teclmology have bred a computer-
savvy opposition in Poland that is capable of breaking into tv news 
broadcasts, producing alternative information that contradicts government 
data, and developing publishing and distribution systems that can spread the 
opposition's cause quickly and efficiently7' 
The Solidarity movement used information warfare tactics to get their message out to the 
largest possible number of Polish citizens. The actions of three astronomers and a local 
engincer exemplifY the ability of a few individuals to influence thousands with information 
technology. These individuals intercepted the state-run television broadcast signal, 
determined the characteristics of the signal. and then used their computer equipment to time 
and configure their own signal. They broadcast this signal over the same frequency as the 
state signal, allowing 60,000 television viewers to see both signals concurrently_ These 
viewers saw the message, "Enough price increases, lies, and repressions_ It is our duty to 
boycott the election ,,16 The government arrested and tried the four for this action After 
being held for four months, they were convicted and ordered to pay fines ranging from $80 
to $120. During their trial, the prosecutor claimed that the voting turnout was ten to 20 
percent lower than average in the region that viewed the pirate television broadcast 
7~Buck Bloombecker, "Of Systems, Solidarity, and Struggle," Datamation, 33, 21 
( I November 1987) 47, Nexis 
16Bloombecker, Nexis 
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The Solidarity movemlo:nt also used computers to perform an independent prediction 
of the election results. This independent check ensured that the "official" government 
estimates were not inflated . The struggle for the Solidarity movement was not merely to 
show that the official count was wrong according to Konrad Bielinski, a leader of this project 
"Rather, we wanted to achieve something more, namely to take away from the state its 
monopoly over giving us information ahout ourselves"" 
The movement also capitalized on the advantages of infonnation technology to 
provide secure, reliable communication between members. Anyone can encrypt and transport 
a massive amount ofdala on disk, In addition to being easier to conceal, a computer disk is 
casier to destroy than a pile of paper 
2. Tiananmen Square 
The Chinese dissidents involved in the Tiananmen Square protest in 1989 did not 
target computer systems, but rather utilized new tcchnology, primarily the fax machine and 
the Internet, to ensure that \vord of what was happening in China made it out of the country 
Students in the United States then took the information that was flowing out of China and 
sent it back into the country via fax machines_ Through the use of this technology, the 
dissidents prevented China' s leadership from controlling the flow ofinfonnation While 
telecommunications assets were restricted in the weeks fo llowing the massacre, 
"Bloombecker, Nexis 
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telecommunications connectivity facilitated its initial reporting and continuing coverage with 
the rcs t of the world 
3. Zapatistas 
The Zapatista uprising in southern Mexico provides another example of rebel 
organizations exploiting high technology_ The Zapatista leadership has used the Internet to 
establish a worldwide organization of supporters that are beyond the control ofMexico' $ 
government. Zapatista leadership communiques are issued via the Internet, instantly 
spreading their message to a worldwide audience without any interference by the Mexican 
authorities or news media interpretation In the same manner as China during the Tiananmen 
Square uprising, Mexico lost the ability to control the flow of information both out of, and 
into, the country. The information received from inside Mexico fostered extensive media 
coverage, limiting the repressive options open to the government While not terrorism, the 
ability to form transnational networks and ensure that the message of an organization is heard 
on a world stage is a tool that terrorists will exploit in the future . If there were no rapid 
communications channels out of the jungles of southern Mexico, it is likely that the Mexican 
government would have been able to use much harsher methods to repress the rebellion 
While the actions of rebels and dissidents are not always terrorism, these incidents 
highlight the fact that a small number of people can have a worldwide impact and generate 
international publicity for their cause without government interference These capabilities will 
appeal to terrorists in the information age 
C. THE RISE OF TECHNOTERRORlSM 
1. Electrical Distribution Networks 
Electrical distribution and energy ~)·stcms have been favorite ta rgets of terrorists The 
use of computers to rJn these ndworks makes them an ideal cyberterrorism target. However, 
as an examination of conventional terrorist and military attacks on energy systems 
demonstrates, these targets may be of limited value to the l:ybcrterrorisl 
Statistics show that there were 240 total attacks on "Domestic Energy-related and 
l'vlilitruy Targets" from 1970 to mid 1980, The most popular oflhe targets were powerlines 
and poweutationlsubstations 78 This trend continued through 1988 with 283 recorded 
incidents of subnational attacks on energy systems in Ihe United States A worldwide target 
summary shows that power pylons and power lines remained the number one target with 
power substations being the third most popular target. 7~ 
Thomas E Griffith, in his thesis entitled Strategic Atlack oj National Electrical 
Systems, studies the military benefits accorded a state hy attacking an enemy electr.cal system 
in a time of war. The apparent lack of utility in attacking electrical systems in war may apply 
to terrorists as well 
7iLisa Maechling and Yonah Alexander, "Risks to Energy Production and Trade." 
in Polilical Terrorism and Energy: The i1lreal andResponse. eds., Yonah Alexander and 
Charles K Ebinger (New York: Praeger, 1982), 140. 
'"'Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Vulnerability oj 
1'elecommuni('ations and Energy Resources to Terrorism, 101st Cong., 1st sess" 7-8 
FebmaJ)' 1989, 252-257 
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Strategic attacks on national power system can be useful in fulfilling national 
security aims, but only under specific conditions. First, the target country's 
power system should be vulnerable to destruction by being very concentrated 
with very few interconnections Second, the strategy behind the attacks 
should he focused on stopping war production over the long lenn. To strike 
electric power to affect civilian morale, increase costs to the leadership, or 
impact the military will waste missions and could prove counterproductive to 
the political aims of the war.IO 
The "critical node" identified by Griffith is the transfonner station, where power is "slepped-
up" or "stepped-down" for Iransmission and distribution. The components at some of these 
sites are custom built and could take up 10 eighteen months to manufacture if they arc 
destroyed in an attack 
The most recent concerted attack on energy systems in the United States was 
undertaken in California by a group calling itself the "Earth N:ght Action Group" who cut 
down two wooden power poles and toppled a I OO-foot transmission tower in April of 1990 
The result of this attack was the loss of power to 92,000 customers for up to a day.u The 
group struck at isolated targets rather than the transformer substations, thus lessening the 
impact of their action. In the late 1970s, the "New World Liberation Front" bombed a Pacific 
Gas and Electric transfonner near San Francisco that disrupted power to 75 ,000 homes for 
approximately two hours. PG&E transformers and offices were bombed 16 times between 
1975 and 1978, leading Research West, a detective agency specializing in terrorism, to call 
l"Thomas Griffith, "Strategic Attacks of National Electrical Systems" (M.A thesis, 
School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1994),59 
" Elliot Diringer, "Environmental Demonstrations Take Violent Tum," Safl 
Frandsco Chronicle, 24 April 1990, A3 
70 
PG&E the "prime victim of terrori sm in the United States."u As press reports have 
indicated, electrical lines themselves arc the most accessible targe ts for terrorists or criminals 
In the Unitt:d States, up to 300 electrical insulators can be shot off by hun [l;.':TS and pranksters 
in a single day 13 These actions are nOI a concerted effort to bring down the electrical system 
by an organized group Rather, they are random acts of vandalism for which the flexibility 
ofthe electrical system can compensate Should an organi;-:cd group simultaneously attack 
several critical nodes (stt:p-up/down transformers) across the United States, the potential for 
disruption increases Chuck Lane 's statements before Congress indicate that the system is 
vulnerable, but it is robust enough to with~'and nearly all attacks 
Tn sununary, this investigation concluded that the networks [energy and 
telecolIUlJUnication] of the United States are vulnerable to multisitc terrorist 
attacks, that is, that targets are likely to be destroyed. However, the 
red undancy of built into the networks make them very dependable, and the 
real question is what level of service would be lost from such an attack. In 
many cases the consequences appear 10 be manageable. In a few cases, 
perhaps too many cases, the consequences are potentially catastrophic i< 
While the physical vulnerability of clectrical system components to destruction is real, David 
Hinman slates, "the flexibility of the system is its greatest set-urity Our security plans mu st 
be built upon this fact in order to have maximum effectiveness."!; 
i2Susan Ager, "Byline," Associated Press, 17 March 1978, Nexis 
"Stephen Bowman, "Lighls Out. Elet-'1ricaJ Systems an Easy Target tor 
Terrorists," Delll'f!r Post, 29 \'fay 1995, 74 
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Still, the capability exists, with relatively unsophisticated technology to disrupt power to a 
12.rge portion of an electrical grid by targeting its critical nodes_ While the wcapons 
technology (fireamls, explosives, etc.) are readily available to a terrorist group, some research 
is required to obtain the knowledge necessary to identify and target critical nodes in the 
energy system Unfortunately, this information is puhlicly available. The infonnation 
contained in public documcnts mandated by the Department of Energy, Federal 
Communications Commission, and Department of Transportation can be used by terrorists 
to plan attacks on infras tructure targets. According to a Government Accounting Oftice 
report of December 19118, a mock terrorist team utilized information obtained from a public 
library to plan an attack on the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in 1987 1 ~ 
\Vhile infrastructure systems in the United States remain vulnerable to physical attack, 
Dr, Robert K. Mullen, does not believe that these incidents will increase in the future, despite 
a grov.lng terrorist presence in the United States 
That being said, there are no indicators of which I am aware, insofar as trends 
in the U S, are concerned, that would suggest to me the threat to energy 
assets here is substantially different from what the recent historical record 
indicates The presence in the US, of terrorist support groups does not alter 
tlrisview17 
While the fragility and relative open nature of electrical systems has been heralded in the 
press, it is the secondary effects of such attacks that concern individuals like Noonan Leach 
16Congress, Senate, 10 
17Congress, Senate, 248 
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Any terrorist group with access to moderate amounts of explosives could shut 
down any city in the United States simply by destroying local transformer 
sites. Not only would vital industries and defense programs be aITected but 
the ensuing blackouts would cause riots in the streets that would threaten the 
stability of-the government" 
Whiie certainly a contributing factor to the civil umest experienced in New York City's famed 
blackouts of ]965 and 1977, the removal of electrical power from a city is neither a necessaT)' 
nor a suflicient cause for "riots that would threaten the stability of the government" The 
riots in the streets of Los Angeles fo llowing the Rodn(,-y King verdict as well as the riots 
(disguised as celtbrations) after major spons championships are won show that disturbances 
can happen with a fully functional electrical system The Labor Day 1988 Seattle blackout, 
in which over 1Ia of the city was without power for 4 ';' days, proves that a blackout does not 
produce riots and looting. in fact, the incidence of crime in the affected area wcnt down, not 
up, due to an intense police presence.!9 The ability to cause a riot with a blackout alone is 
thus suspect While a terrorist group may be able to exacerbate a crisis situation thaI it has 
fomented ""ith the addition of a blackout, a blackout in isolation is not a failsafe way to "ignite 
the masses" 
While the above situation has focu~ed primarily on the physical attack of energy 
systems to cause disruption, the increasing computer control of these and other infrastructure 
sy~1cms provides a potential target for a terrorist group. The California Department of Water 
iiNofman S. Leach, " Terrorism in Your Own Back Yard,' Security Management, 
33,5 (May \989) 56, Nexis 
'9Congress, Senate, 63 
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Resources recognized the risk inherent in these systems in 1991 when they implemented strict 
physical sewrity control measures to protect their central (;Qmputer center. The computers 
contained at the center were used to control the release of water from the major darns in the 
state The increased security was a result of a perceived increase in the terrorist threat during 
Operation Desert Storm.9{I 
The possible physical risks, such as the shutdown of power plants or release ofwatt:r 
from behind dams, will continue to increase as computerization of control systems continues 
The true "critical nodes" of any system lie in its command and control network. By striking 
at this link to disable or control the system, a terrorist precludes the necessity to attack 
clements of a distributed system physically, such as transformers or pumps 
There are many parallels between energy systems and information warfare targets 
Critkal nodes exist in all networks that will impair the entire system. Attacking anything but 
these critical nodes may result in a minor degradation of service or, if the system is correctly 
designed, no disruption at all. Thus, the attacks on energy distribution system components 
such as power lines and pylons cause limited disruption for regional customers but widespread 
outages are very rare. While the information on the physical layout and vulnerabilities of an 
energy system exist, it has not been a panicularly effective terrorist target. This may be due 
to the lack of organizational and manpower assets available to a terrorist group. In addition, 
those targets that are "critical nodes" may have enough security to prevent their destruction 
'''Roben Crabbe, United Press international (Sacramento), 25 January 199! , 
Financial report, Nexis 
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The pattern ortcrrorist attacks on electrical systems may provide an insight into infonnation 
age terrorism_ If systems can be engineered to be redundant in some areas (and thus able to 
rcoover from attack) and defended in others (to prevent attack), it may mitigate the risks of 
widespread outages 
2. Attacks 011 Computer Systems 
While the public has perceived buildings and airplanes as the primary targets of 
terrorists, attacks on computers were involved in 60% of conventional terrorist acts by 
1989 0l The pattern of criminal computer attacks, together ",'ilh terrorist activity, suggest that 
there may be a shift toward cyhencrrorism as a physically le% risky mcans to achieve both 
criminal and terrorist ends 
Europe and the United State.~ 
[n the 1970s the Italian Red Brigade~ launched 27 attacks against companies 
that did husiness in the electronics, computer, and weapons sectors, Tn 1980, the French 
OIganization Comite Liquidant ou Detoumant les Ordinakurs (Computer Liquidation and 
Deterrence Committee or CLODO) undertook a series of attacks on computer compao.ics in 
the Toulouse region The organization released a statement to the press, "We are workers 
in the field of dp (data proce~sing) and consequently well placed to know the current and 
91.\1arvin 1. Cetron, "The Growing Threat of Terrorism," The Futurist, 23, 4 (July 
1989) 20, Nexis 
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future dangers of dp and telecommunications. The computer is the favorite tool of Ule 
dominant. It is used to exploit, to put on file, to control, and to repress ,,91 
A Belgian Group, the Cellueles Communistes Combattants (Fighting 
Communist Cells) conducted a series of bombings in September 1984 directed against 
Honeywell Controls and Litton Jndustrie~. In November 1984, the same group attacked the 
Brussels office of Motorola. Computers were prime targets in each of these attacks 
Similar attacks have occurred in the United States. liM's offices in White 
Plains N. Y. were bombed in March 1984. The group claiming responsibility for the attack, 
the United Freedom Front, distributed a newsletter that stated "liM is a death merchant 
The computer is an integral pan ofthe fascist South African govenunent's policies of 
racist repression and control,>9] 
The CLOnO group struck again in 1983 by firebombing a Sperry-L'nivac 
computer room in Toulouse to protest the U.S. invasion of Grenada Upon putting out the 
fire, the message, "Reagan attacks Grenada- Sperry Multinational is an American 
accomplice ' was found spray painted on an interior wall. 94 
While the attacks on computer systems failed to cause any major political 
victory for CLOOO, they did heighten tile awareness that European computers are vulnerable 
92John Lamb and Jame~ Etheridge, "DP: Thc Target ofT error," Dalarna/ion 32 (I 
February 1986) . 44, Nexjs 
9JLamb and Ethcridge, Nexjs 
94Reuters Nonh European Service, 'Attack Against US Computer Finn" 26 
October 1983, Nexjs 
76 
to attack A ~ 979 report by the Swedish Defense :Ministry reconunended that the government 
become involved in monitoring <.;ompuler security of both public and private computers 
\Vhile the proper role of the government in computer security remains open for debate, an 
article in the French daily Llf Figaro states that computer aUack~ might be more harmful to 
national security than the assassination of random politicians 9) 
Japan 
In 1985 in Japan, the Middle Core Faction, a tCIToris! group consisting of 
approximately 300 individuals, attacked the commuter rail system to cause massive disruption 
during the height afrush hour, The group used C2W techniques to carry out its attack by 
first cutting stratcgjt: power and communications cables that fed the computer controls for 
the rail system. Secondly, the group jammed police and rescue radio frequencies in an 
attempt to hamper and delay response by the authorities \\lllite no one was injured in this 
attack it caused a major commuting delay affecting 6.5 million commuters alld cOSt the Japan 
National Railway~ more than $6 million in lost ticket sales"" Rather than blowing up or 
tampcring with the physical destruction of one rail, the group focused on the critical node 
(control circuits) and disabled the entire system by using technoterror, attacking physical 
targets to cause a disruption in cyberspace. The disruption was extensive enough that the 
Centralized Traffic Control Office of Japan National Railways (ft\.'R) was forced to stop 
9'''France. Terror by Technology," The Economist, 19 April 19 1980,44, Nexis 
%Eugene Moosa, "Hundreds of Police Hunt for 300 Rail Saboteurs," Associated 
Press, 30 ~ovember 1985, Nexis 
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operation. While the attacks were successful in creating disruption, the effects were short 
lived, with most of the severed cahles hack in full service within 24 hours 91 This attack, 
while creating problems for millions of conunuters, was also linked to specific objectives. The 
first was to show solidarity with the National Railways Locomotive Engineers' Union, which 
was on strike to protest the plaillled privatization ofthe ~'R. The second goal may have been 
to influence the trial ofHiroko Nagata, the leader of the Extreme Leftist United Red Army 
Her hearing was delayed hecause the rail shutdown prevented her defense lawyer from 
making it to court on time.91 
The combination of computer controls and energy systems raises new 
possibilities for telTorists. While targeting of energy systems in the past has relied primarily 
on the physical destruction of key assets to disrupt service, the potential vulnerability of the 
control systems poses an even greater risk 
Political Motivation 
The rise oflnformation Warfare tactics may allow tomorrow' s telTorists to 
focus their attacks on certain individuals to change their policies or courses of action. The 
increasing reliance on computers has opened new avenues for blackmail and political pressure 
In 1984, a hacker penetrated TRW's credit report computers and obtained some incriminating 
infonnation about a past small-claims court dispute involving then incumbent Congressional 
91Moosa, Nexis 
'"Japan Economic Newswire, "Radical Guerrilla Assaults Stop J1\'R Train Runs," 
29 November 19&5, Ncxis. 
78 
candidate Tom Lanto~ of California This information was passed to his opponent who 
further distributed the infonnation to tht: press to discredit Lantos, In a second act of political 
computer crime, a hacker gained access to Representative Ed Zshau's computer system in 
Washington, D,C and erased his data, including his correspondence and constituent 
database."') 
These events highJight the potentially selective nature of future cyberterrorism 
and crime With a skilled computer operator, a terrorist group may be able to penetrate 
systems to manipulate a small number ofpeoplc Instead of attacking the public to affect a 
target audience, cybcltCrrori~ts may choose to alfect the target audience to achieve their ends 
directly 
d Environmental Group.f 
Wbile "conventional" terrorist groups have targeted computer systems in the 
past, 'eCQ-tl::rror" groups, such as Earth First, have advocated anacking computer systems 
In 1987, the group puhlished a manual that advocated both physical destruction of computer 
equipment (conventional terrorism) and software and data manipulation/de~truction (via 
cyberterrorism). The manual also induded techniques to reduce the fisk ofheing caught by 
using advanced hacking techniques .]()O The risk of cyberterrorism exists on all fronts . It is 
'>IJ)ouglas E. Campbell, 'The Intelligent Threat," Security A4anagement 33, 2 
(March 1989) 19A, Nexis 
IOOCampbell, Nexis 
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not merely limited to the "classic" conventional terrorist group Any group with a strong 
interest or agenda will be able to attempt cybenerrorism 
Criminal Activity 
Criminal activity directed at, or using, computers is receiving increasing 
attention in the prtlss. The tlxpansion of the Internet to include conunercial venUlres has 
sparked a debate over the correct level of security that should be afforded individuals in 
cyberspace. As terrorism is often crime with different intent, several criminal acts will be 
explored in this section. First, the case of a Russian hacker attempting to steal more than $1 0 
million highlights the vast amount of money being transferred in cybtlfspace. Second, the 
attempt to use computer .... -iruses to hold computers hostage or attack a specific company will 
be examined. Finally, the possible physical risks to individuals as a result of criminal 
cyberspace activity are addressed in the case of a Texas professor 
(1) Citibank. The use of computers and computer technology to 
perpetrate crimes has already occurred. Citibank recently "lost" $] 0.2 million electronically 
to a team of Russian hackers. A closer examination of the facts involved in this incident 
reveals some strengths and weaknesses of computer crime. First, the authorities can use the 
same technology employed by the cyberterroris\ or criminal to track and capture him 
Someone can, however, remain anonymous in cyberspace if they are not seeking fmaneial 
gain, as virus writers have proven 
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This incident according to 101m Mohr, vice president oflhe Ne .... York 
Clearing House, is unique in that it utilized a personal computer_WI It appears that Vladimir 
J _ levin, a Russian computer expert employed by AO Saturn, a SL Petersburg trading 
company, broke into Citibank's computer system using stolen account identification numbers 
and passwords \I/ith th:s information, he made 40 transfers from Citibank to accounts set 
lip by accomplices in California and Israel. These transfers occurred !loom June to October 
1994 and \vere tracked by Citibank to determine who was responsible for the crime While 
Citibank allowed the transfers to wntinuc, the accounts into which he was transferring the 
money were frozen \\'hiJc T.cvin attempted to transfer more than $10 million in this period, 
Citibank ha~ recoveled all but $400,000. Amy Dates ofCitibank had the tollowing answer 
when questioned ahout the level of security at Citibank: "\Ve move half a trillion dollars a day 
through the payment system_ Compare that to the $400,00CI they were able to withdraw. We 
think we have the right level of security_ "10: Despite these statements, Citibank implemented 
a new computer protocol to increase transaction ~ecllrity 
It is still undcar how Levin obtained the account numbers and their 
associated passwords, hut an investigation is continuing into the possibility of inside help 
Citibank, has implemented a nevI' secUlity system for its computer accounts that entails the 
lise of"smarl cards" that will generdte a new password for each transaction_ This technology 
; 12IlanselL 31 
"Citibank Fraud Case Rai~es Computer Security Questions, Ne./, 
3] 
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helps to defeat password "sniffer" programs that allow criminals to capture passwords as they 
are transmitted across the network for futu re use, This may have been how Levin obtained 
his passwords, He appears to have had access to the network for some time before 
attempting his crime as he was careful to follow the patterns of routine transactions and kept 
his individual transfers to below $300,000 to avoid "built-in" security programs that would 
have highlighted the transaction as abnormal_ 10l 
While the adoption of the smart card security system and the 
employment of encryption technology has, Citibank hopes, corrected the security weakness 
exploited by Levin and his friends, the amount of money lost in this crime is relatively small. 
The high leve! of publicity afforded this incident is due to its extranormality, not its dollar 
value Each year, according to the American Bankers Association, the foJlO\ving amounts are 
lost due to crime. Check fraud- $10 Billiun, Credit Card fraud- $712 Million, ATM fraud-
$18 _Million, and Online fraud (as in the Citibank case)- $5 \1illion_lo4 While Citibank could 
use its computers to track and eventuaUy catch Levin, computers and high technology aided 
in the success of a Vietnamese check fraud ring that operated undetected tor seven months 
The U, S_ Secret Service investigated the crime under the name, '·Operation Paper Dragon" 
and found that the ring took in $25 Million in just over half a year.!O~ These high technology 
iGlJohn Manson, "Bank's Security Chain's rattled," Financial Times (London), 20 
September 1995, 20, Nexis 
lO4Kelley Holland, "Bank Fraud, The Old-Fashioned Way," Business Week, 4 
September 1995, 96, Nexis 
lO'Holland, Nexis 
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money making schemes may appeal to terrorist organizations of the future who are unable to 
secure, or do not desire, state sponsorship. While attractive to terrorists, the security 
measure~ put in place by the banking industry to prevent criminals w:illlikely defeat terrorists 
as well 
(2) Virust:s, In an apparent attempt to extort money, the (;omputcrs 
of several universit ies wefe infected with a vin1s in an attempt to make them hostage~ The 
virus demanded a ransom for the antidote to the virus 
Computer users who found the vims were told to send $2,000 to an address 
in Pakistan to obtain an immunity program that would rid the system of the 
virus. Investigation showed that the virus was written by two brothers in a 
computer store in Lahore, Pakistan- they had put their names, and address, 
and a phone number in the virusl "It's like a fantasy of being a terrorist 
without the blood," said Eric Corley, editor of a national hacker newsletter, 
2600, whose electronic bulletin board was also infected 106 
The brother<;' scheme did not pay well, and the virus was eradicated without their "immunity 
program." The "fantasy" of being a terrorist without the blood may hecome reality when an 
organization uses cybenerror weapons in an attack 
Recently, a virus was used to attack a specific business in Germany 
A virus writer, known only as "The Wizard" created then released a virus that he called the 
"Media Nfarkt advertising virus ,. Media Mark! is a German home-electronics group and was 
not involved in the virus writing or distribution. Y1edia Markt's lawyer claims that "this is the 
first time that someone has distributed. a virus and tied it to a company that has nothing to do 
lO6Campbell 
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with it,,'07 To stave off negative publicity, Media Markt has distributed an anti-virus program 
to disable the virus on affected computers 
'While the true intention of the virus writer may never be known, the 
principle of indirect attack (attacking the general public to influence a target audience) 
nonnally utilized by terrorists was evidenced in these tactics. The virus writer, unleashed an 
attack on the "innocent" computer users to create negative publicity for Media Markt. In this 
case, Media Markt was clearly not involved in this activity_ However, the anonymous and 
anarchic nature of cyberspace opens the possibility of creating chaos and making it appear as 
if someone else is responsible. While it appears that financial gain motivated the Russian 
hackers in the Citibank case, the possibility exists that terrorists or criminals could perpetrate 
electronic attacks in the future to weaken the target company, not make money. If a terrorist 
group could place someone ·'on the inside" of a software company and infect software with 
a virus before shipment, it may call the integrity oftha! software company into question 
While there are no reported cases of terrorists staging a concerted information wartare attack 
on a business, the ca:;e ofCitibank might be a benchmark. Despite news that it had lost more 
than S I 0 million, Citibank stock went up by Y, a point on the day that the Russian hacker 
story broke .lO! 
'OJMatthew May, "Super Snoopers or Plain Bad?" Times (London), 18 August 
\995, Nexis 
IQ' "Wall Street Friday" AFX News, 2 1 A\lgu~"t 1995, Nexis 
84 
(3) Personal Attacks. The potential exi~ts for terrorists to single out 
individuals in cyberspace. III 1994, a hacker logged into a Texas A&M professor's E-mail 
ac(;ount and used the account to send out 20.000 racist messages. To those receiving the 
messages, it appeared that tJJcy had comc from the profcssOl A~ a result, the professor began 
to Jeceivc death threats,lG9 
3, The Threat From Hackers Turned Terrorist: Is it real? 
Penetration of computer systems is not difficult. The U,S Defense Information 
Systems Agency undertook a penetration study of Department of Defense computers, In 
1994, the agency attacked 8,932 servers and mainframes. They were able to gain access to 
7,860 (88%) of these systems. Only 319 (4%) of these attacks were detected and omy 19 
( 2%) of the successful attacks were ever reported. ilo The percentages suggest that even 
organizations that depend on computers to function rarely know when hackers have attacked 
them Penetration of DOD systems has also been documented by other than DOD assets, 
sucb as the case of Defense computers being attacked by Dutch hackers during the Gulf War 
Willie none ofthese penetrations were used for terrorist purposes, it is entirely possible that 
this may occur in the future. Even if the hackers initially do not have terrorist intentions, they 
remain dangerous. A Government Accounting Office report on the Dutch hacker case states 
that, 'the majority of the hackers' activities appeared to be aimed at gaining access to DOD 
l~ochelle Gamer, 'The Growing Professional Menace," Open Computing, July 
1995,32, Nexis 
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computer system and then establishing methods for later entry. I)! Should a computer hacker 
decide to work with terrorists, or be forced 10 work with terrorists via blackmail, these 
methods for later entry constitute a serious risk 
The jump from hacker to terrorist is a small one that depends entirely on the hacker's 
motivation and intent. While these cases prove that hackers can penetrate systems, it does 
not examine the motivation for the hacker. Several studies of the group dynamics and 
individual motivations for terrorists have been undertaken to help prevent terrorism. While 
similar studies on the "computer underground" have been undertaken, an analysis of how a 
terrorist organization might recruit a hacker would he worthwhile. III As the world becomes 
more dependent on computers, understanding what makes hackers "tick" becomes as 
important as understanding what motivates terrorists 
4. The Internet Worm 
The \988 Morris Internet Worm incident highlights the incredible disruptive power 
of information warfare tactics for a cyberterrorist, as well as the limitations inherent in 
attacking computers 
On November 2, 1988, Robert Tappan Morris, a Cornell University graduate student, 
released a "wonn" onto the Internet. \Vh.ile Morris maintains that it was just an experiment 
III Government Accounting Office, Hackers Penetrate DOD Computer Systems, 
Statement of Jack L Brock before Senate Subcommittee on Government Information and 
Regulation, 20 November 1991, 1-4. GAOfT-IMTEC-92-S 
112Gordon R . Meyer, "The Social Organization oflhe Computer Underground" 
(MA thesis, Nonhern Illinois University, 1989) 
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that went terribly wrong, the Justice Department decided to prosocute Morris, who was found 
guilty of a felo ny and sentenced to three years probation, $10,000 fine and 400 hours of 
COlmllunity service. In March of 1991, his appeal to the U.S . Court of Appeals for the second 
ci rcuit was uns\H.:cessful, In the fall of 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court refuscd to hear his 
case lU 
The worm program, created as an experiment by Morris, was based on three separate 
security f1aw~ that Morris had di~covered in the Berkeley version oflhe UNIX operating 
system. The goals of his program werc: to infect three computers per network location 
across the Internet, to avoid slow machines and any network that wa~ in use (to avoid 
detection by operators), use infected computcrs to find connections to other uninfected 
computer~, steal the password file~ of computers and usc the passwords to gain access to 
even more computers I" 
Computers had fascinated Morris his entire life Morris' father, Bob Morris, was a 
computer engineer for Bell Labs, the creators of the UNIX operating system. The area of 
computer security had been a hobby of Robert Moms throughout his college years. His 
knowledge of computer systems was so extensive that both the Naval Research Laboratory 
and the National Security Agency, NSA (where Bob Morris was serving as director of the 
National Computer Security Center) invited him to speak to the topic of UNIX operating 
!JJKatie Hafner and Jolm Markoff, Cyberpunk: Outlaws and Hackers on the 
Computer Frontier (New York Touchstone/Simon and Schuster, 1991) 345-6 
Il 'Hafner and Markoff, 296 
system security. That this was a problem about which the NSA was deeply concerned 
became apparent during Morris's trial. The presentation to the NSA was videotaped and the 
prosecution intended to show part of the tape concerning "how not to get caught" to show 
that Morris had written his program with malicious intent to break into computers. Robert's 
defense lawyer, Tom Guidoboni, threatened to force Robert's father to testify about the 
"Jational Secmity Agency' s interest in computer penetration, to include divulging classified 
material if the tape was shov.m. Possibly as a result ofNSA pressure, the tape was not used 
in the trial and the NSA was able to protect its secrets.'" 
The knowledge that Robert Morris had obtained in his study of computer security was 
extensive. He had been aware of two flaws in the UNIX system for over a year before his 
WOlm was released. The final flaw, in the FTP, File Transfer Protocol, program (a utility in 
UNIX that allows individuals on different computers to transfer files back and forth betwel::ln 
remote systems) was corrected before Morris could finish his program, so he was forced to 
adjust and exploit omy the rl::lmaining two wl::laknl::lsscs. Thesl::l weaknl::lsses were in the 
sendmatf portion of the operating system and in thl::lfinger utility. It was a combination of 
these two weaknesses that allowed the worm to spread from computer to computer. The 
worm was originally designed to limit its growth, with each copy of the program checking to 
see if other copies were already running on a system before attempting to replicate. If there 
were other copies running, they would "negotiate" with each other to see which one would 
L1lHafner and Markoff, 328-9 
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terminate Unfortunately, the program that agreed to terminate would infect many other 
compUlers before it stopped running. Additionally, one in seven of the copies or tile wonn 
would not check to sec if there were other copies present before infecting a machine. In 
effect, it refused to die on its own. This "one in seven" system, coupled with the fact that the 
portion of the program controlling wonn 10 worm communication was improperly written, 
led to a massive proliferation of worms on thousands of computers on the Internet, causing 
delays and forcing machines to be taken off the network 
The battle to "beat" the worm was intense. The meeting of Berkeley UNIX experts 
was fortuitous in that several leading experts, including the creators of the operating system 
were in the same place and were able to collaborate on finding a solution to the problem 
Within 24 hours, the Berkeley team had discovered how the program spread and had 
corrected the problems in the senc/mail portion of thc operating systcm. In less than 48 
hours, all the weakncsses that the program attempted to exploit were correeted and the 
"fixcs" were sent out to all users on the Intcrnet Thc attempt to understand the virus was 
hampered by its having hecn encrypted by Morris_ Fortunately, the encryption scheme was 
extremely weak and was quickly broken, allowing the experts to unscramble the code. The 
next step was to "reverse engineer" the code by decompiling it into source code to study its 
design and ensure that it did not have "malicious" (data altering/destroying) instructions 
hidden in the program Fortunately for Ihe users of the Intemet, Morris did not write the 
WOI\11 to destroy data on infected computcrs, it would mcrely replicate out of control until 
the machine became overwhelmed with copies of the worm. Had the worm been written to 
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destroy data, thtl recovery time would have been much longer with potentially massive data 
loss. Despite the rapid response of system experts, the publicity created hy the incident was 
nearly as overwhelming in the media as the wonn was to the infected computer systems, The 
wonn caused so much disruption that the New York Times carried the story on page one for 
an entire week Additionally, both the Wall Street Journal and (}SA Today gave it front-
page coverage Television news and talk shows were aiso filled with discussion on the 
worm.' L" 
This incident, while not malicious, highlights the power of infonnation warfare 
techniques to cause massive disruption without physical harm to equipment or people. One 
man created a national computer crisis with a small program that received international 
attention and was addressed at the highest levels of the U.S. government While appearing 
attractive for terrorists, this incident highlights both the positive and the negative aspects of 
information warfare for terrorism 
5. Positi~'e and Negative Elements for the Cyberterrorist 
rhe ability of one man, in this ease Robert T, Morris, to generate such an enonnous 
amount of disruption and publicity with a small 3,000 line computer program might be very 
appealing to a terrorist organization attempting to achieve its aims with minimum effort and 
risk. Morris was eventually brought to trial for his wonn, mainly because he spoke of its 
creation to several people. A dedicated cyherterrorist could remain anonymous in the same 
""Peter J, Dtlnning, "The Internet Worm" in Computers Under Allack: Intruders, 
Worms, and Viruses Peter J. Derming ed. (Massachusetts: ACM Press, 1990) 193-4 
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manner that the ovcn-vhelming majority ofvinJs writers (such as the author of the famous 
Michelangelo virus - who remains unidentified) escape identification 
The personal equipment and money expenditures required for this incident were 
minimal as :-"1orris had access to Cornell University's computers_ While in the late 80s, 
Internet access was not widespread, today it is expanding at an exponential rate, with mOfC 
individuals wnnecting to the network every day_ The number arhos! computers connected 
to the Internet rose 30% from I July to 1 October 1994.1\7 The possible avenues of attack 
have expanded exponentially, as all that is required for a computer attack is a computer, a 
modem, <Uld a skilled operator with the requisite information. The increasing number of host 
computers represcnt both new targcts and new platforms from which to launch an attack 
As the power of computers doubles every 12-18 months, the computing power that 
was once reserved for major corporations and the govenunent is now available to individuals 
Since the "tools" are widely available, it is now the knowledge of how to manipulate those 
tools that is most important to perpetrate a computer attack The knowledge that MOTTis 
used to attack the Internet came from extensive study of the UNIX operating system_ He had 
known about the flaws for at least a year before writing his program to exploit their 
weaknesses. The cOTTeetion of the FTP weakness immediately before Morris completed his 
wonn program highlights the fragility of this infonnation Had that been the only weakness 
known to Morris, all of his work would have been for naught. An ell:1ernal attack on a 
117f<jgures ohtained from Internet Society International Host Distribution survey at 
ftp.isoc.Ofglisocleharts2.fhostslhosts_xls . Also see Internet World, November 1995 
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computer system usually occurs through weaknesses in the software that are unknmvn to the 
creators of the software. Those attempting to gain unauthorized access to a system exploit 
these "bugs" in programs. Once a "bug" is discovered. software developers usually rapidly 
distribute a "patch" that will correct the error. The flaw that took a hacker several months 
to find can be corrected in a matter of seconds with the installation of a software patch. The 
hacker or cybenerrorist is then forced to search for yet another weakness in the system That 
flaws in software exist, and are often unknown until exploited, is a double-edged sword for 
the potential cyberterrorist. IfcybeJterrorists learn of a weakness in a computer system, every 
day that they wait to exploit that weakness may allow a legitimate security professional or 
non-malicious hacker to discover aIKl advertize the weakness, leading to the rapid distribution 
ofa sofuvare or hardware fix to the problem. Additionally, if cyberterrorists wish to create 
massive disruption, they will be forced to "show their hands" and exploit the weakness on a 
large number of systems or on several high value systems, If they are clever, they may be able 
to throw system managers off the track for a short period of time 
Additionally, by using publicly available encryption techniqucs, they can scramble their 
program so that it will take years to decrypt and examine. This will exacerbate the fear of the 
unknown, as system managers will be unable to determine the true intent of the program, If 
malicious, it may require the systems to be completely shut down and all the software 
reloaded from a "known" clean source If the rouge program could not be completcly 
understood and then removed without damage, a complete shutdown would be required for 
all systems that handled critical data or were used to control systems upon which human lives 
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depend. Thc disruption would be far grcaterthan that caused by the Morris worm, as it could 
be controlled, decrypted and safely removed from systems without damaging any of the 
existing software Of negatively affecting the integrity of data on the machines 
The recent controversy over Nctscape Corporation's use of encryption to secure 
Internet transactions highlights the strength and weakness of current encryption schemes 
This particular encryption program was designed to allow users to send confidential 
information (such as credit card numbers) across the Internet securdy. A French graduate 
student in mathematics used two supercomputers and 120 computer workstations to "brute 
force" decrypt (trying all possible combinations of the "key" in succession until the COrTect 
one is found) a message using this encryption program in just less than eight days. This 
encryption scheme used a 40 bit key (meaning its "key" length was 40 bits- a bit is a single 
o or 1 in binary code) since it was the most powerful scheme thai the U,S , government would 
allow to be exported, The key employed by Netscape within thc L;nited States is 128 bits 
This 128 bit key, utilizing the same decryption techniques, would take 1016 more t ime to 
break (about 2,1918 x 101' years) 
In less than one month after the brule force decrypting of the 40 bit message, two 
graduate students at Berkeley discovered a software flaw that would allow them to decode 
a message encrypted with the 128 bit key in less than one minute. Netscape promptly fixed 
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the probltlm and released an updated version of the encryption program within days to rtl-
secure the system lU 
The ability \0 create a program or send each other mesw.ges that would take law 
enforcement or government agencies 2.1918 x 102< years to unscramble is very appealing to 
cyberterrorists and common criminals. If a law enforctlment agency intercepts an encrypted 
computer message, it is useless until it can be decrypted. This may allow cyberterrorists to 
move away from using the slow, but relatively secure, face-to-face method of communication 
for a potentially more securtl , worldwide, and nearly instantaneous communication channel 
offered by encrypted E-mail The Institute for National Strategic Studies concluded that the 
communications signals themselves are becoming harder to intercept with the advent of 
"digital technology, frequency-hopping and spread-specuum technologies, plus replacement 
of microwave with optical fiber for long-distance communication " The rise of public key 
encryption led the Institute to conclude that the capabilities ofthe codemakers are outpacing 
those of the codebreakers. \1 9 The grov.ing ubiquity of encryption, despite several setbacks, 
as in the Netscape case, has still made it difficult to obtain infonnation that individuals desire 
to keep secure 
The value of encryption, and the ability of business to drive a response to crime, can 
be seen in the development of the GSM (Global System for Mobile communications) cellulru 
l" Aaron Zitner, "Netscape Flaw Scen Setback for Busine%," Boston Globe, 20 
September 1995, 33 
1l9SlrQlegic Assessment 1995 (Washington D.C National Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 1995), 153 
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phontl standard, which IIses encrypted digital signals to prevent eavesdropping and phone 
fraud. Whi le in the United States, which uses an analog system, A..~S (Advanced Mobile 
Phone Service), a thief can steal the user IO to a cellular telephone (by intercepting its 
Ilnencrypted signal) to perpetrate phone fraud. In GSM, this signal is randomly encrypted 
each time the phone is used, making it useless unless the correct "key" to decrypt the signal 
is in the possession of the interceptor. While the GSM system cuts down on cellular phone 
fraud, it also compounds the diffiwlty of intercept ing the oommunications of known 
Un li ke the physical world, in which a potential aggressor needs time and money to 
procure or manufacture its weapons, and time to train people to use these weapons, all of 
which can tx: observed and defenses readied by the target of aggression, the preparations of 
"weapons" in cyberspace is often the work of olle (or several) individuals and occurs in the 
relative privacy and security of their own computers. With the explosion of processing 
power, the computers sitting in homes throughout the world are more powerful than the 
minicomputers of a decade ago_ Unlike conventional terrorism, where the weapons of 
destruction are outlawed or restricted to use by the state, the weapons in cyherterrorism are 
available equally to the state and the terrorist organization For a cyberspace WMD, the 
critical component becomes knowledge of computer systems, not the ability to procure 
fissionable material The state and the terrorists operate on nearly equal footing in 
cyberspace 
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The rapid recovery and complete eradication of the Intemt.:t wonn, to indude defenses 
against it ever occurring again, 3fe not paralleled in the conventional world . A truck bomb 
manufactured from fertilizer and dit:sel fuel will cause damage and terror every time a terrorisl 
parks it in or near a building and detonates it. Despite knov.ring the damage that caf and truck 
bombs can cause through numerous attacks in the :Middle Easl throughout the J 9805. 
authorities in the U.S . were unable to prevent the World Trade Center llombing in New York 
City or the Murrah Federal Building bombing in Oklahoma City. While improved technology 
and procedures allow authorities to respond more rapidly to these attacks and take some 
limited measures to prevent the attacks, they cannOI ensure that a "copycat" crime wiH not 
occur. In cyberspace, once a wlnerability is noted and a software fix is distributed, a second 
attack of exa<..-tly the same nature v.iJ1 always meet with defeat. What was once an open door 
becomes an impenetrable brick waiL If cyberterrorists were planning to exploit an identified 
and corrected weakness, all their effort was for naught Their cyberspace "bomb" simply will 
not work. They ean attempt to take his bomb cisewhere, but only if computer security 
administrators have shirked their duties and not installed "fixes" \.vill they succeed 
The limited and fragile nature of weaknesses in cyberspace will force cyberterrorists 
to choose their targets carefully_ Since an attack in cyberspace is likely to be a "one shot 
deal ," terrorists must consider the cyberspace target to be of sufficient value to use their one-
shot weapon If a target is not sufficiently valuable, a cyberterrorists may choose to risk 
waiting until they can penetrate a system that will carry a substantial impact if attacked_ A 
second factor affecting the nature of a cyberterrorist target is the likelihood that the disruption 
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created will be temporary instead of pennanent, as in the case of physical destruction of a 
target by a conventional or technoterrorist. The temporary nature of the disruption may cause 




Thc vulnerability orus. tclccomrnurucations and other infrastructure targets led to 
hearings before Congress, numerous reports and books, and grist for the "tcclmothriller" 
novel industry The relative weakness of US infrastructure and information systems to 
terrorist attacks is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for infonnation age terrorism, 
which this thesi~ has grouped into conventional terrorism, technoterrorism, and 
cybertelTorism Conventional terrorism will continue to operate exclusively in the physical 
world Technotcrrorisrn will operate in the physical world to create a cyberspace di~ruption 
and cyberterrorism will operate exclusively in cyberspace. To addres~ the level of threat 
posed by these types of terrorism, this thesis h~ examined some weaknesses in the system, 
and also the possible motivation for the usc of information warfare by terrorism. While 
weaknesses and vulncrabilitie~ may exist in the ~ystem, and the tools to exploit these 
weaknesses may be developed or purcha~ed by terrorists in the future, the present concem 
over an "elecuonic Pearl Harbor" rnay be slightly offbase 
Information warfare tactics do not create terror in the same way as conventional 
terrorist tactics. As such, a shift in the definition of terrorism is required to group 
cyberterrorism v.'ith conventional terrorism Including cybenerrorism in the overall category 
of terrorism allows scholars and policy makers to place this new threat into a known 
framework that provides the foundation for funher study and the development of prevention 
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and response measures Building on classic terrorism, cyberterrorism may sllift toward a 
more "demassified" threat with shifting state sponsorship. The purpose of this new type of 
terrorism may be to send a very specific message via disruption of systems as opposed to 
destruction of property and the killing of citizens. New technology will expand the struggle 
between terrorists and counter-terrorist forces into cyberspace where "classic" offense. 
defense, and deterrence do not exist. Instead, both sides will be forced to deal with the new 
opportunities and drawbacks that exist in cyberspace. The experience of both the business 
community and the U.S government is valuable in detennining how to combat tllis new 
threat. An effective combination ofthis oollective experience will provide the best solution 
to the problem of countering cyberterrorism 
A. SHllI'Ll\lG D£I·lNlTION OF TERROruSM 
1. The Role of Violence in Terrorism 
An examination of the elements of terror and symbolic violence highlighted the value 
of physical violence in the creation of terror. While not as effective in inducing terror, 
information warfare lactics allow tomorrow's terrorist to cause great disruption without 
physical harm to individuals. The violence of the cyberterrorist exists exclusivcly in the virtual 
world of cyberspace. While conventional terrorism will still involve physical destruction of 
property and human life, cyberterrorism will utilize cyberviolence and "virtual" destruction 
of data in cyberspace. While directly causing no casualties, this action will still fulfill the goals 
of advertizing, morale building, disorientation, and response provocation. Some cyberterror 
actions, such as anaclcing safety or oontrol systems (avionics, air traffic control, etc.) have the 
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potential to create cascading failures that willlcad to loss oflife, Cyberterrorists will, in many 
cases, havtl the option of including destruction along with disruption to create terror and a 
more pennanent result. \\rnile we have yet to see the combination of political motivation and 
criminal activity in cyberspace, we cannot disregard the potential of this type of terrorism 
B. IMPACT ON TERRORISM L~ THE Fl;TlJRE 
lnfonnation warfare tactics allow a terrorist group to operate without the support of 
a large terrorist organization or a wealthy state sponsor. In addition, terrorists will utilize the 
emerging cryptography and global telecommunications system to climb out of the 
"dragonworld" of COVtlrt communications as described by J Bowyer Bell and enhance their 
ability to communicate in a secure fashion with members scattered across the globe These 
tactics may have several effects on future ttlfTorist organizations 
J. Demassification 
First, terrorist groups may become more "demassifted" In The Third Wave, 
Alvin Tomer describes how society is shifting away from large, centralized organizations to 
smaller, more distributed elements. The ability to steal $10 million electronically overnight, 
and the ability to exercise conunand and control utilizing "off the shelf' conunercial 
technology may sound the death knell for state sponsored terrorism Groups that formerly 
took direction and were controlled or supported by state actors, will now move into 
cyberspace, supporting themselves through criminal activities and removing the need for 
basing by becoming distributed organizations around the world. This lack of state (;Untrol and 
funding will remove one of the key elements in present countcr-terrori~m planning-the 
101 
punishment or coercion of the sponsoring state. The freedom from state imposed restraints 
will also allow terrorists to target all states in the future, not only those directed by the 
sponsor 
2. New State Sponsors 
The lower level of support required to execute a cyberterrorist strategy may 
have the opposite effect, actually increasing state sponsorship. Poor states that did not have 
the means to support an international terrorist organization an~ now bc(;oming connected to 
the world via the Internet and new telecommunications systems. Argentina, iran, Peru, Egypt 
and the Philippines had the highest percentage growth in Internet wnnections from July to 
October of 1994, Each experienced growth ranging from 419% to 134%120 All regions of 
the world do not match these numbers. Africa has 35 of the world's least developed states 
in terms of telecommunications, an essential ingredient for connectivity with the rest of the 
world. Over the last 10 years, Africa has had the lowest growth in teledensity, the number 
ofrnain telephone lines per 100 inhabitants. It was estimated to be .91 in 199 1. States such 
as Sweden, with an index of 68, Switlerland, Canada, Denmark, Finland, and the United 
States, all with indexes in the 50s, lead the world in teledensityll! The increasing numbers 
of connections from states that have sponsored terrorism in the past, such as Iran, as well as 
those that have not, is a new threat. These states may view cybenerrorism as an ideal tool 
with which to strike the infonnation dependent first world Cyhenerrorism may also appeal 
l.lOIntemet Society Figures 
"'William Wresch, "New Lifelines,' Internet World November 1995, 103 
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to Slates as it has the added benefit of pl.1usible deniability_ There will be no large money, 
material, or communications "':raiJ" to lead back to the sponsor state 
3. Targeted .\1essage 
While the world (and terrorist groups) are demassifying, industry and business are 
pursuing more "targeted" production and advertising. This strategy attempts to focus the 
manufacturing and selling of products to a select audience. Technology is emerging to allow 
advertising to just those customers who arc most likely to purchase a product. Terrorists in 
the information age may also mirror this trend, with new techniques and weapons Ihat allow 
them to affect a target audience without resoning to violence against the general populat ion 
This technology also allows a terrorist message or action to affect many more people than 
was possible btfore Thus, the "target" for terrorism can be as large or as small as the 
terrorist sees fit The growing, worldwide, interconnectedness of individuals and 
organizations may change the role played by the media in past terrorist events While 
tenorists havt staged many events in the la~t 25 years to gamer maximum worldwide media 
auention ('72 Olympics, World Trade Center bombing, Airplant hijackings), the exponential 
growth orthe lntcmet and the introduction of Direct Broadcast Satellites with more than 500 
channels and an 18" receive dish may allow ttITOrisrs to formulate, create, and distribute their 
own "news" to millions around the globe. The role of computers and fax machines in the 
Tiananmen square uprising is well documented. The Zapatista rebel organization in Mexico 
used the Internet and World Wide Web extensively to promote their cause and get their 
"message" to sympathetic audiences around the world 
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4. Rise of Disruption not Destruction 
The final change that information warfare tactics may bring to terrorism is a shjit in 
terrorism itself Tn the future, terrorist organizations may move toward tactics that attempt 
10 achieve the terrorist goals without physical violence_ This corresponds to the current 
thinking about the future of warfare_ John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt have stated 
Wmarc is no longer primarily a function of who puts the mosl capital, labor, 
and technology on the battlefield, but of who has the best information about 
the battlefield. What distingui~hes the victors is their grasp of information, 
not only from the mundane standpoint of knowing how to find the enemy 
while keeping it in the dark, but also in doctrinal and organizational terms. III 
In the information age, shifting the definition of terrorism to include violence in cyberspace 
may be necessary, where electrons, not people are attacked, in the same manner as physical 
violence is presently included 
Despite these changes, many "classical" terrorist organizations motivated by 
"conventional" objectives \vil! remain viable. Terrorist groups, regardless of their level of 
sophistication, will adhere to the logic of symbolic violence and the creation o f terror. While 
it is likely that conventional terrorist groups will evolve into hybrid groups employing both 
violence and infomlation warfare cyberviolence, we may see the creation of new and unique 
terrorist organizations unlike those of the past, where dose personal ties and ideology were 
necessary to maintain security. The terrorist organization of the future may not have any 
"homeland" other than (..)'bcrspace. While it is difficult 10 track selected individuals in just one 
' Il Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 141 
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country or region, tracking a small number of individuals who could be anywhere on the 
globe, who can communicate in a secure and instantaneous fasnion with each other, is likely 
to pose an order of magnitude increase in the problem 
5. New Tools for Attacker and Defender 
The "information age" provides many tools to assist in countering conventional 
terrorism It also presents a host of new problems associated with countering techno and 
cybenerrorism. The standard offenscldefense and prevention/preemption/disruption dynamics 
of counter and anti-terrorism in the physical world do not have direct counterparts in 
cyberspace. Tn the virtual world, a small number of individuals, with the right information, 
are as powerful as large state actors The "balance of power" in cyberspace can shift in a 
matter of seconds, with the insertion or deletion of several lines of code to a program, or the 
installation of a new security protocol The lessons from past conventional counter and anti-
terrorism tactics are only of limited value in understanding the effectiveness of offense and 
defense in cyberspace 
Offense an.d Defense in CybeTspace 
The initiative in cyberspace does not necessarily rest with those 
pursuing an offensive strategy In keeping with conventional terrorism, it is the terrorist 
group that normally attempts to seize the initiative by launching an offensive attack on a 
symbolic target. This attack is usually meant to undermine the belief that the government can 
protect its citizens. The government is then forced to reexamine and often change the way 
it attempts to maintain security Tn cyberspace, no government has prOmised to guarantee 
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"safety and security" as they have in the physical world In the anarchic world of cyberspace, 
each individual serves as their own sovereign state The government has addressed the 
security of individuals only in limited fonn, with passage of several laws concerning computer 
security_ The commercial sector has attempted to defend the individual with the introduction 
of virus d~cction and encryption programs_ Neither business nor government has advocated 
an offensive posture against computer hackers and potential cybcrterrorists_ The focus has, 
out of necessity, been directed toward defense_ The use of offensive tactics would work well 
if the enemy could be unambiguously identified A skilled cyberterrorist can make the 
identification of those responsible, a cornerstone of conventional US counterterrorism 
policy, exponentially more difficult in cyberspace. Even ifan attacker in cyberspace can be 
identified, the range of responses open to the defender is somewhat limited In the case of 
an unsophisticated hacker or crimina!, access to the network can be denied 
C. RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM 
The problems posed by the emergence of cybcrtcrrorism mirrors many of the problems 
presented by information warfare between states What is the correct balance between U.S 
government protection and commerciaJ sector protection? The possible solutions run the 
gamut from a completely government to a completely commercial protection o f information 
The best solution will likely lie somewhere between these two poles 
1. Government Response to the Problem 
[he U , S _ govemment, through a variety of agencies is responsible for the vast 
majority of counter and anti-terrorism activities and policies in the United States 
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Governments meet with other states to negotiate cooperative agreements concerning the 
prosecution of terrorists and their sponsor states The U.S. military has been utilized on 
several occasions to respond to terrorism and signal the resolve of the United States to 
counter terrorism by force if necessary. This situation is not mirrored in cyberspace, where 
borders are meaningless and international standards are generally sct by multinational 
tc(;hnical committees with liUle government input_ The nature of cyberspace creates severa! 
fu ndamental questions_ While tht: government is committed to defending the rights orv.S. 
citizens in the physical world, with force ifnccessary, it has not made the same sweeping 
commitm~"Ilt to its citizen> in cyben;pacc. The concept of being an "American" in cyberspace 
rapidly loses any meaning ...... i th the explosion of intemational wnTIcctions to the Intemet 
While a computer may be physically located in the Urrited States, the majority of its users may 
reside in another country. Should t he U . S govemment defend the rights of these individuals 
in cyberspace in the same manner as "official" US citizens? 
2. Commercial Response to the Problem 
The actions taken by individuals and indus!!) to combat the "hacker threat" are, at 
present, the best response to a portion ofthe tenorist information warfare t hreat. As we have 
seen, the wnfidentiality, integrity, and availability of data are cri tical in the information agc 
The growing ubiquity of encryption, 'with products such as Netscapc offering 128 bit 
encryption for es transactions raises the threshold to a level where it is not remotely cost 
effcctive to attempt to "brute force" decrypt a message for its contents. With the further 
int roduction of smart cards and rdndorn password authentication, plus the addition of new 
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communication protocols that prevent "spoofing" or fooling the network into thinking you 
are someone else, the confidentiality of data is becoming a reality. The new protocols, used 
with encryption and "digital signatures' will ensure the imegrity of data as welL The 
availability of data remains a lucrative target for cyberterrorists at present. This target is 
rapidly disappearing with the growing redundancy of communications paths that are becoming 
available to data The loss of one A TM network did not cause a shutdown of all the A ThIs 
in the United States, rather, it only affected about 2% of AIM users. In several years, with 
the addition of global cellular communications equipment, the paths that data will have from 
point A to B Voill be redundant to a point where a terrorist oould not disable all of them at 
All of the above actions were driven by the commercial sector, not by the government 
We have entered an age where the military and the government no longer have the capability 
to develop technology and give the "spin-offs" to the commercial sector. Rather, the 
commercial sector has taken the lead in innovation and development of technology and the 
government and military are constantly trying to "spin-on" this technology by adapting civilian 
products to military use. Ths has leveled the playing field in cyberspace, for a cyberterrorist 
has the same access to this technology as the goverrunent 
3. The Middle Road 
A composite Government/commercial response may be the most beneficial in 
protecting against a cyberterrorist threat. The networks of the United States can be viewed 
in much the same manner as postal routes. There are laws that protect the individual from 
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unauthorized tampering with mail \vhile it is in transit to its recipient regardless of the carrier 
(U S. Postal Service, Federal Express, United Pared Post, etc.). Senders ofan authorized 
package havc every right to assume that the government will ensure that their package is 
delivered intact and unopened to its fina l destinat ion. In extreme cases, such as letter bombs 
and illegal materials being sent, the government becomes involved in tracking and prosecuting 
those who abuse the system at the expense of public safety or in violation of the law 
lvfateria ls that are detrimental to the national security of the United States naturally receive 
much attention from Fedcral authorities. It is up to the sender of each package to ensure that 
they properly wrap it for shipment If it is infonnation that is unimportant, they can send it 
on a postcard, with the writing openly visible to anyone who may see the carr.! The more 
sensitive the information, the more tightly wrapped the package becomes. Encryption serves 
as the '·wrapping" on the messages sent out via public networks. The more sensitive or 
important the information, the higher the level of encryption required to ensure that the 
message will be authentic and intact when it reaches its destination While unencrypted E-
mail may be adequate for some matters, other correspondence will require increasingly higher 
levels of classification for protection, With the diffusion of encryption technology, it will 
become increasingly easy to ensure confidentiality of all messages. In the postal analogy, the 
government docs not guarantee sen'ice by all companies in the delivery service Rather, it 
maintains a level of general safety in which all can operate. Thus, both public and private 
utilities and tek'Communications cruriers can expect the govcrrunent to become involved when 
a major problem occurs. While each company is responsible for "low level" problems, such 
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as routine security at warehouse~ and the collection of overdue bills, the government will 
assist in correcting "high level" problems where lives are at stake due to the content of the 
material being shipped. The government, in effect, protects the individual from the carrier and 
the carrier from the individual 
The difficulty in the age of information is determining what constitutes a cyberspace 
letter bomb and how it is different from a benign cyher-postcanJ. Whcre is the level between 
"low level" and "high level" problems to be drawn? The anarchic nature of cyberspace has 
prevented any attempts at close regulation hy the government (witness the Clipper chip 
controversy). Every individual must take a certain level of responsibility for their own 
"safety" in cybcrspace. \Vhile U. S citizens have a reasonable expectation of set,"Urity within 
the borders of the United States, the ability of the U.S. government to protect them decreases 
as they venture further abroad. The same is true in cyberspace, where a user in a closed 
network ha~ a reasonable expectation of security. As soon as users connect that network to 
the Internet it is open for attack by anyone. It is up to the user to prevent low level attacks 
by "locking his doors" and following good computer security practices. 1n so doing, a 
computer user can defeat all but the most advana:d opponents in cyberspace In cases where 
it the information is deemed to be sufficiently important, the government can be called in to 
assist in defense of that information and its associated network 
D. FUTURE RESEARCH 
While the government may be called upon to assist in the defense of cyberspace, the 
doctrinal and organizational foundations have not yet heen established to allow for this 
110 
involvement. Further study of this prohlem is necessary to ensure that any government 
involvement is proportional and effective While cyberspace can place individuals and states 
on equal footing, the ,1me dearly retains an advantage in the physical world. This advantage 
may provide a useful tool in the prosecution of cyberterrorism While the doctrine of 
asymmetric response was utilized during the Cold War to deter a nuclear exchange, a 
cyberspace equivalent of this doctrine may prove useful in the information age. If a state 
commits to defending cyberspace, the first (;Ourse of action is likely to be the securing of 
systems to prevent unauthorized access By raising the threshold of skill and technology 
required to penetrate a system amateurs and unskilled cyberterrorists may be deterred from 
pursuing an offensive in cyberspace. By securing systems from "low level" attacks, the 
various government agencies involvcti in counter and anti-terrorism ",ill be free to pursue the 
"high level" threats that are sure to exist in cyberspace. [t remains to be seen ifan offensive 
response, such as a military strike against a computer center or selected organizations, will 
be tolcrdted by the citizens of !he United Slates. Will peop[e be willing to launch an air strike 
against computer telTorists in the same fashion as they were launched against terrorist training 
bases in Libya? The implications of an offensive, asymmetric response to the terrorist 
problem must be explored, as a response that exists exclusively in cyberspace may not be 
sufficient to dt.'tcr, or even slow down a cyberterrorist. At the dawn of the information age, 
the borders of the United States are no longer secure. We must recognize the potential threat 
and adjust our thinking to formulate an effective individual and state response 
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APPENDIX A: TERRORISM TYPOLOGY 
A, TY PO LOGY 
"Conventional" terrorism is important because cyberterrorism will remain, in the near 
furure, subordinate to conventional terrorism The implications of infonnation warfare tactics 
and techniques for both terrorism and counterterrorism are summarized in this typology to 
highlight how terrorism and the response to terrorism may change in the future , 
From Conventional Terror to Cy berterror 
The following chart summarizes the key components of "conventional" terrorism, 
technoterrorism, and cybenerrorism 
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APPENDIX B: SAMPLE TE RRORISM DEFlNlTIONS 
The official definition of terrorism contained in Title 22 of the United States Code, 
Section 2656f(d) is as follows 
The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetuated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or 
clandestine agents, usually intended to iniluence an audience 
Components oft/Lis government definition are seen throughout the academic literature on the 
subject of terrorism. These definitions range from the limited to the all inclusive. In a 
questionnaire sent out to leading terrorism scholars by Alex Schmid, the foUowing responses 
were given to the question "Whose definition of terrorism do you find adequate for your 
purpose?" 
Table I l l) 
lUAlex P. Schmid, Political Terrorism (New Brunswick : Transaction Books, 
1983),73. 
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Several of the more popular definitions of terrorism are quoted below in order to 
show the common threads of violence and political intent in the academic definitions of 
T error is a symbolic act designed to influence political behavior by 
cxtranonnal mean~, entailing the use or threat of violence_12< 
the use or threat of use, of anxiety-inducing extranormal violence for 
political purposes by any individual or group, whether acting for or in 
opposition to established governmental authority, when such action is 
intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target group wider than 
the immediate victims and when, through the nationality or foreign ties of its 
perpetrators, its location, the nature of its institutional or human victims, or 
the mechanism of its resolution, ilS ramifications transcend national 
boundaries. I2S 
terrorism- the attack on an individual to frighten and coerce a large number 
of other~- is a~ old as civilization it~clf It is the recourse of a minority or 
even of a ~ingle dissident frustrated by the inability to make society shift: in the 
desired direction by what that society regards as ' legitimate' means. It is 
primarily an attack on the rule oflaw, aimed either to destroy it or (as in more 
recent times) to change it radically to conform to the terrorist's idea of 
society. (. .) Terrorism is not precisely the ~ame a:; violence. Terrorism aims, 
by the use of violence or the threat of violence, to coerce govenunents, 
authorities or populations by inducing fear T elcvision has enormou~ly 
expanded their ability to do 50.126 
II'Thomas Perry Thornton, "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation," [mernal 
War: Problems and Approaches, ed_ Harry Eckstein (New York: Free P ress of Glencoe, 
1964), 73 
mET Mickollls, Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology oj Events, 1968-1979 
(London AJdwych Press, 1980), XIII-XIV as quoted in Schmid Political Terrorism 
12"R Clutterbllck Guerrillas and Terrorists (London: Faber and Faber, 1977), 
11,21 as quoted in Schmid Political Terrori~m 
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Terrorism is a method of combat in which random or symbolic victims serve 
as instrumental tar~_ These instrumental victims share group 
or class characteristics which form the basis lor their selection for 
victimization, Through pn:vious usc of violence or the credible threat of 
violence other members oftha! group or class are put in a state of chronic fear 
~ This group or class, whose members' sense of security is 
purposively undermined, is the t!!g~_ The victimization of the target 
ofviolencc is considered cxtranormal by most observers from the witnessing 
audience on the basis cfits atrocity; the time (c.g . peacetime) or place (not a 
battlefield) of victimization or the disregard for mles of combat accepted in 
conventional warfan:. The norm violation creates an attentive audience 
beyond the target of terror; sectors of this audience might in tum form the 
main object of manipulation The purpose of this indirect m~'thod of combat 
is either to immohilize the target ofterror in order to produce disorientation 
and/or compliance, or \0 mobilize secondary targets of demands (e,g. a 
govemment) or 1l!!gtl.s of attention (e.g. public opinion) to changes of attitude 
or hehavior favoring the shon or long-term interests of the users of this 
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